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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
: Case No. 960831-CA 
vs. 
TONY R. MAESTAS, 
Defendant/Appellant. : Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions for distribution, offering, agreeing, consenting, 
or arranging to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance (cocaine), within 1000 
feet of a public school, a first degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-
8(l)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1991), and possession of a controlled substance (cocaine), a third degree 
felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1991), in the Third 
Judicial District Court, Michael R. Murphy presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL and STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Ineffective assistance. Where a confidential informant's testimony was 
corroborated by other witnesses, and drugs and money were found on defendant's person, 
did defense counsel prejudice the trial outcome by not impeaching the confidential informant 
with his prior criminal record and early parole? 
M[W]here the trial court has held a Rule 23B hearing and made specific findings 
relevant to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, [this Court will] defer to the trial 
court's findings of fact." State v. Huggins, 920 P.2d 1195, 1197 (Utah App. 1996) (citing 
State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1238 (Utah App.1995)). It will Mthen apply the appropriate 
legal principles to the facts and decide, for the first time on appeal, whether the defendant 
received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment/1 Id. 
However, "appellate review of counsel's performance must be highly deferential; 
otherwise the 'distorting effects of hindsight' would produce too great a temptation for 
courts to second-guess trial counsel's performance on the basis of an inanimate record." 
State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 466 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984)). 
2. Suppression of evidence. Should drugs found on defendant have been suppressed 
on the ground that the search was incident to an arrest effected by corrections officers 
acting outside the scope of their statutory authority? 
Defendant asserts both trial court error and ineffective assistance of counsel. Where, 
as here, a defendant did not timely assert his challenge to a search, he must on appeal 
demonstrate "plain error, meaning that error was obvious and substantially prejudicial." 
State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, f 56 (Utah 1999) (citing State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 
2 
1224 (Utah 1993)). See issue 1, above, for the standard of review applicable to ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims. 
3. Probation revocation. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in finding that 
defendant willfully violated the terms of his probation? 
"The decision to grant, modify, or revoke probation is in the discretion of the trial 
court." State v. Peterson, 869 P.2d 989, 991 (Utah App. 1994) (quoting State v. Jameson, 
800 P.2d 798, 804 (Utah 1990)). "Thus, in order to prevail in this case, defendant 'must 
show that the evidence of a probation violation, viewed in a light most favorable to the 
trial court's findings, is so deficient that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking 
defendant's probation.'" Id. "Moreover, a trial court's finding of a probation violation 
is a factual one and therefore must be given deference on appeal unless the finding is 
clearly erroneous." Id. (citing State v. Martinez, 811 P.2d 205, 208-09 (Utah App. 1991)). 
In making this determination, the appellate court will view the evidence "in a light most 
favorable to the trial court's findings." Martinez, 811 P.2d at 208 (quoting State v. Jameson, 
800 P.2d 790, 804 (Utah 1990) (emphasis omitted)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The text of the following provisions is reproduced in addendum A: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-13-1 (Supp. 1991); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-13-6 (Supp. 1991); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-13-8 (Supp. 1991); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-13-10 (Supp. 1991). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Original prosecution 
Defendant was charged by Information dated 25 March 1992 as follows: 
Count I Distribution, offering, agreeing, consenting, or arranging to distribute 
a controlled or counterfeit substance (cocaine), within 1000 feet of 
a public school, a first degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1991); 
Count II Possession of a controlled substance (cocaine), a third degree felony, 
in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1991) 
(R. 6-7). The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress (R. 36). A jury found 
defendant guilty on both counts (R. 69-70, 73-74). 
The court sua sponte committed defendant to the Utah State Prison for a 90-day 
diagnostic evaluation (R. 81, 84-85). It later ordered defendant released from the Utah 
State Prison and booked into the Salt Lake County Jail for purposes of an evaluation 
by Odyssey House (R. 98). The court instructed defense counsel that, if defendant did 
not meet the acceptance criteria for Odyssey House's treatment program, he should find 
an alternative treatment program (R. 98). 
After numerous continuances, defendant was sentenced on 27 December 1993 to 
statutory prison terms and fines (R. 99-106). However, the prison terms were stayed 
and defendant placed on 36-month probation on stated conditions (R. 104-06). Defendant 
filed a notice of appeal, but the appeal was dismissed for defendant's failure to file an 
appellant's brief (R. 76, 109). 
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Probation revocation 
On 24 June 1994, Adult Probation and Parole filed a "Progress/Violation Report" 
charging that defendant had violated the conditions of his probation (R. 110, addendum 
C). The court issued an Order to Show Cause and held an evidentiary hearing (R 117117-
21, 125, 129, 131-32). The court revoked defendant's probation and committed him 
to the Utah State Prison (R. 131, 143-48, 152-54). 
Defendant timely appealed (R. 150). This appeal was dismissed 17 January 1995 
on defendant's motion for voluntary dismissal (R. 156 [unnumbered page]). 
Johnson resentencing 
On 7 April 1995, represented by new counsel, defendant filed a Verified Rule 65B 
Petition for Relief from Conviction and Extraordinary Writ alleging trial errors and also 
complaining of conditions of his confinement (HC: 1-5).1 On 17 June 1996, at the 
suggestion of the State, the court resentenced defendant nunc pro tunc to statutory prison 
terms (R. 174-77, 663).2 See State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 38 (Utah 1981). Defendant 
timely appealed (R. 178). The Utah Supreme Court poured the case over to the Utah 
Court of Appeals (R. 207). 
1
 The proceeding under rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, was a new matter 
assigned Civil No. 950902479 HC. This brief will refer to record pages in this civil case 
thus: "(HC: l)." 
2
 Since the petition did not allege ineffective assistance of counsel {see HC: 1-5), it is 
unclear—but irrelevant to this appeal—on what basis the court resentenced defendant. 
5 
Rule 23B hearing 
This Court remanded the case to the district court pursuant to rule 23 B, Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, for "entry of findings of fact regarding appellant's claim of 
ineffective assistance of his trial counsel" (R. 770). The district court held an evidentiary 
hearing and entered findings of fact (R. 779, 784-790). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Facts from triaP 
Leo Lucey is a certified peace officer in the State of Utah and an investigator for 
the Department of Corrections (DOC) (R. 383-84). Lucey recruited Teresa Gabaldon, 
an AP&P probation officer, to work on a special project to apprehend persons supplying 
drugs to inmates of the Utah State Prison (R. 355, 368, 374-75, 384-85). Lucey had 
been informed that inmate Tony Waldron had knowledge of this prison drug trade (R. 
385). He asked Waldron if he would act as a confidential informant, and Waldron agreed 
(R. 374, 382, 385). He was promised "a letter" if he helped out (R. 379). 
Eight to ten officers were involved (R. 385). They targeted approximately four 
to five potential suppliers whom Waldron would attempt to contact (R. 385). 
On 14 March 1992, Gabaldon drove inmate Waldron to the Salt Lake homes of 
two drug dealers to effect controlled buys (R. 355-58). Waldron wore a "wire" (R. 360). 
3
 Except as otherwise noted, this brief recites the facts in the light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1205-06 (Utah 1993). 
6 
The dealers were Patricia Chacon and Jeanette Appleman (R. 356). At Appleman's 
apartment, Gabaldon and Waldron talked about buying drugs with Chacon and Appleman, 
who paged their supplier (R. 358-59).4 By early afternoon the supplier had not arrived, 
so Appleman, accompanied by Gabaldon, walked to a 7-Eleven to place another page 
(R. 359-62). 
While waiting for the page to be returned, Appleman talked to Gabaldon about 
other possible suppliers (R. 362). Appleman said that her neighbor had a brother named 
Tony Maestas (defendant) who could get drugs for her, but that she had no way of reaching 
him (R. 362). However, she added, he often dropped by her apartment and that he might 
drop by and they could buy cocaine from him (R. 363). After waiting for the original 
supplier to return the page, they gave up and went back to the apartment in case defendant 
stopped by (R. 363). 
In the meantime, Waldron, who had remained behind at the apartment house, entered 
Appleman's apartment, where he met defendant and another man (R. 375-76). Waldron 
told the men that Jeanette was out making a phone call trying to get some cocaine (R. 
376). Defendant then pulled out a little bag and said, "I have this right here" (R. 376). 
It was cocaine (R. 431-32). Defendant asked Waldron if he was a cop, and Waldron 
said no, but was on a "home visit" (from prison) (R. 376-77, 403). The other man then 
left the apartment (R. 377). Waldron purchased some cocaine from defendant for $100 
4
 This apartment was within 1000 feet of a school (R. 392-93). 
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and defendant left (R. 377). From a surveillance van, DOC Officer Kim Allen observed 
the men enter and leave Appleman's apartment (R. 402-04). He and Officer Lucey also 
monitored the entire conversation over Waldron's body wire (R. 388, 403-06). 
When the women returned from the 7-Eleven, Appleman said to Gabaldon, "Well, 
there they are now . . . I know I can get some stuff from them" (R. 363). Appleman 
walked over, talked to defendant and his companion, returned to Gabaldon's car, pointed 
to defendant, and said, "Well, he already sold him [Waldron] cocaine" (R. 363). Gabaldon 
parked the car and waited for Waldron to come out of the apartment (R. 363). 
Waldron came out of the apartment, got into Gabaldon's car, gave her the cocaine 
that he had purchased from defendant, and they notified other agents that the drug buy 
was complete and identified defendant and his companion as the sellers (R. 364, 377). 
Those agents, armed peace officers, stopped the car in which defendant was a 
passenger (R. 409, 412, 422). Officer Sundquist searched defendant and found a folded 
dollar bill containing cocaine and a wallet with $385.25 (R. 419, 432). 
Defendant gave his version of events at trial, admitting he was in the apartment 
with Waldron, but denied selling him cocaine. He claimed that he asked to use the bathroom 
in Appleman's apartment and when he went in, "I found one hundred bucks. Of course 
I'm going to pick it up if it's lying there, so I picked up the money" (R. 438). In fact, 
he maintained that he the right to take the money: "I thought it was mine, yes. I found 
it" (R. 451). He justified his actions thus: "It's money. Money. It's money" (R. 452). 
8 
He testified that he told Waldron, "How much do you need? If you give me the 
money I could probably get it [the cocaine]," but that he intended to steal the money 
(R. 447). He also claimed that as he was leaving the apartment Waldron handed him 
a dollar bill—"it was like a handshake"—and he just looked at it and said, "Right on" 
and put it in his pocket without thinking about it (R. 439, 442). Defendant testified that 
he knew the bill contained drugs, but took it because "it was for free" (R. 444). 
Facts from the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress 
Teresa Gabaldon, a DOC officer acting undercover, accompanied a confidential 
informant, Tony Waldron, on an undercover drug operation in Salt Lake City (R. 232-33). 
Waldron was wearing a body wire (R. 237, 242). Officer Leo Lucey, a DOC investigator, 
monitored all of Waldron's conversations from a surveillance van (R. 241-42). Officer 
Ken Allen, a supervisor for Adult Probation and Parole, both monitored the wire and 
watched the events through a telescope (R. 258, 258-59). 
Waldron asked Jeanette Appleman and Patricia Chacon to line him up with someone 
to sell him some cocaine (R. 233). Gabaldon accompanied Appleman to a 7-Eleven, 
where the latter paged her supplier (R. 234). This attempt to locate a supplier "had nothing 
to do with Maestas" (R. 239). However, while waiting for the supplier to return the page, 
Appleman mentioned that defendant "sold cocaine, and she'd be able to get some from 
him if she could locate him, but that he did not have a telephone or a pager" (R. 234). 
She said he often stopped by her apartment (R. 234). 
9 
While Appleman and Gabaldon were gone to the 7-Eleven, the sale had taken place 
as follows. Two Hispanic males (one later identified as defendant) got out of a car and 
approached Jeanette Appleman's apartment, where Waldron was (R. 244, 259, 264-66). 
Over the wire, Officers Lucey and Allen heard a knock at the door (R. 244, 259). Officer 
Allen heard a conversation between the two men and Waldron (R. 259). Thereafter, 
one of the two Hispanic men returned to the parking lot, leaving defendant and Waldron 
as the only males in the apartment (R. 257, 259-60). Lucey heard defendant ask Waldron 
what kind of drugs he wanted; shortly thereafter Waldron notified Lucey that the transaction 
had been completed (R. 244). 
When Appleman and Gabaldon returned to the apartment house, defendant was 
in the parking lot (R. 235). He told Appleman he had already sold Waldron some cocaine 
(R 235, 238). Waldron got into the car with Gabaldon and gave her the drugs (R 235-36). 
Defendant and the other Hispanic man drove away, followed by police (R. 270). 
They were stopped and searched (R. 271). A bindle containing cocaine and $384 in 
cash were found on defendant (R. 271). 
Waldron was searched before and after the transaction and had no drugs (R. 240, 
248). At the time of the transaction, Waldron had "been guaranteed nothing but a 
recommendation to the Board of Pardons" (R. 254). 
Waldron did not testify in this hearing (see R. 228). 
10 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Ineffective assistance. Assuming arguendo that defense counsel was deficient 
for not discovering information usable to impeach Waldron, defendant suffered no prejudice. 
Waldron's testimony was corroborated by other witnesses in every material respect. 
Officer Allen viewed the entire transaction from outside the apartment house. He and 
Officer Lucey monitored the entire drug transaction over the body wire Waldron was 
wearing. And defendant himself told Appleman that he had sold Waldron some cocaine. 
Finally, defendant had cocaine and money on him when he was arrested. 
In view of this incriminating evidence, defense counsel's failure to discover and 
disclose Waldron's forgery record, prison drug use, and early release and re-incarceration 
before trial are not sufficient to undermine confidence in the verdict. 
2. Suppression. Because this claim is unpreserved, defendant may prevail only 
upon a showing of plain error or ineffective assistance. Neither appears here. 
The agents who arrested defendant did not act in clear derogation of the statutory 
limits of their authority. The statute upon which defendant relies does not clearly limit 
DOC authority, but merely contains an illustrative list of some of DOC's "primary" 
purposes. Furthermore, defendant thrust himself into the middle of the sting and offered 
to sell drugs, an offer that peace officers were not required to ignore. Additionally, 
defendant was on notice that the drugs he was selling could end up in the prison. 
11 
Even if the agents exceeded their statutory authority, defendant is not entitled to 
suppression. Under Fourth Amendment law, the validity of an arrest is measured against 
constitutional law, not statute criminal rules. Since defendant does not claim the arrest 
was without probable cause, it supports a constitutional search. Nor is defendant entitled 
to suppression under state law, since the violation was neither prejudicial nor in bad faith. 
Because any violation was neither obvious nor prejudicial, defendant cannot establish 
either plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel. 
3. Parole revocation. Viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's finding, 
the evidence supports the court's finding that defendant wilfully violated parole. 
Tracy Anderson, clinical director of Odyssey House, testified that defendant had 
the ability to comply with the rules of the program, which prohibited suicide attempts 
or ideation. Anderson even warned defendant that if he continued that behavior that 
he would not be able to stay there, a warning which made sense only if defendant had 
the ability to comply with the rules of the program. 
Clinician Nieto opined in effect that defendant's misconduct was originally 
manipulative, but that this manipulative behavior worked defendant into such a frenzy 
that his further misconduct was caused more by that frenzy than by any intent to manipulate. 
In contrast, no one testified that defendant was unable to comply with the rules, 
that he was unable to control his rage when he saw his ex-wife's house during an Odyssey 




WHERE THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT'S TESTIMONY WAS 
CORROBORATED BY OTHER WITNESSES, AND DRUGS AND 
MONEY WERE FOUND ON DEFENDANT'S PERSON, DEFENSE 
COUNSEL DID NOT PREJUDICE THE TRIAL OUTCOME BY NOT 
IMPEACHING THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT WITH HIS PRIOR 
CRIMINAL RECORD AND EARLY PAROLE 
Defendant claims that his "trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel 
by failing to present evidence at trial directly impacting on the credibility of the state's 
key witness, Tony Waldron." Br. Aplt. at 11. Defendant points to evidence of "Waldron's 
crimes of dishonesty and the favorable treatment he received shortly after his involvement 
in securing Maestas' arrest in this matter." Id. 
Rule 23B hearing. The following facts were found by the trial court on remand 
pursuant to rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.5 According to Department 
of Corrections records, available pursuant to the Government Records Access and 
Management Act, UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-2-101 et. seq. (1993), Tony Waldron was 
convicted on eleven counts of forgery, aggravated assault by a prisoner, felony fleeing, 
possession of a forged writing, and fraud (R. 786-87). Corrections described him in 1987 
as an inmate who "cannot be trusted at all" (R. 787). In 1990, AP&P concluded that 
5
 No transcript of this hearing was possible because of a malfunction in the videotaping 
process (R. 808). Accordingly, the State relies on the findings of fact entered by the trial 
court, annexed as addendum B. 
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"it would not be wise to allow [Waldron] to participate" in an undercover narcotics 
investigation because of his history of drug dependency and attempted escape (R. 787). 
Waldron was suspected of smuggling drugs at the prison dairy into D block, and admitted 
injecting steroids at the dairy (R. 785). In the late 1980's he was disciplined twice for 
a positive urinalysis and three times for possession of a controlled substance (R. 788). 
On 14 March 1992, Waldron participated in the undercover operation that resulted 
in defendant's arrest and conviction (R- 786). On 2 April 1992, a Special Attention Hearing 
was held by the Board of Pardons; although Waldron's scheduled parole date was 14 
January 1993, he was paroled that day (R. 785-86). 
Nevertheless, according to Leo Lucey, the Corrections investigator who recruited 
Waldron, "the only compensation Waldron received fo[r] his role as a confidential informant 
was a letter of recommendation to the Board of Pardons that Waldron not lose his parole 
date as a result of a dirty urine test" (R 787). Lucey also stated that f,[t]here were absolutely 
no promises or guarantees made to Mr. Waldron as to what the Board of Pardons and 
Paroles [sic] would do with this recommendation" (Defendant's ex. 6). 
The trial court found that Victor Gordon had represented defendant at trial (R. 
784). It made no finding concerning Gordon's knowledge of, or attempts to obtain, the 
foregoing information.6 Nor did it make any findings on admissibility or prejudice. 
6
 Defendant speculates that Gordon "likely failed to introduce the evidence because he 
was unaware of it, supporting the determination that Gordon failed to investigate the matter" 
Br. Aplt. at 13; see also id. at 11, 17, 21. 
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A. Since Waldron's testimony was abundantly corroborated, trial 
counsel's failure to fully impeach him was not prejudicial. 
Controlling legal principles. ,f[A] defendant claiming ineffective assistance of 
counsel has the difficult burden of showing actual unreasonable representation and actual 
prejudice." State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d 1250, 1259 (Utah 1993) (emphasis omitted); see 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984); State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681, 685 
(Utah 1997), cert, denied, 119 S. Ct. 89 (1998). When reviewing counsel's performance, 
"a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide 
range of reasonable professional assistance." Taylor, 947 P.2d at 685 (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
In order to meet the prejudice requirement, defendant must show that counsel's 
errors were so serious as to deprive him of a fair and reliable trial. Id. at 685; State v. 
Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990). This in turn requires a showing that "there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Templin, 805 P.2d 
at 187. A reasonable probability is one "sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." 
Id. "[Pjroof of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative matter but must 
be a demonstrable reality." Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993). 
"If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient 
prejudice, which . . . will often be so, that course should be followed." Strickland, 466 
15 
U.S. at 697. Thus, unless a defendant "has demonstrated that he was prejudiced by his 
trial counsel's performance, [the court] need not decide whether that performance was 
deficient." State v. Arguelles, 921 P.2d 439, 441 (Utah 1996). Accord State v. Huggins, 
920 P.2d 1195, 1199 (Utah App. 1996). 
Trial counsel's failure to discover a key witness's criminal record may draw into 
question his "industry and acumen" and yet not undermine confidence in the verdict. 
Hoots v. Allsbrook, 785 F.2d 1214, 1221 (4th Cir. 1986). 
This case. Disposing of the ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of prejudice 
is the easier course here. Even assuming arguendo that defense counsel was deficient 
for not discovering information usable to impeach Waldron, defendant suffered no prejudice. 
Waldron was not, as defendant asserts, "the only witness to directly link Maestas 
to the drug transaction." Br. Aplt. at 23. In fact, the entire story of the crime was told 
in detail at the suppression hearing without Waldron's testifying (R. 228-78; summarized 
at pp. 9-10 herein). 
Waldron's trial testimony was heavily corroborated. Officer Allen saw defendant 
enter the apartment, followed by two Mexicans (R. 402-03). He also observed one of 
the Mexicans—the one who was not defendant—leave the apartment before the drug deal 
occurred (R. 404-05). Officers Allen and Lucey then monitored the entire drug transaction 
over the body wire Waldron was wearing (R. 388, 403-06). Shortly afterward, Appleman, 
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after talking to defendant and his companion, informed Gabaldon that defendant had 
sold Waldron some cocaine (R. 363). 
Finally, when police stopped defendant and his companion, Officer Sundquist searched 
defendant and found a folded dollar bill containing cocaine and a wallet with $385.25 
(R. 419, 432). 
At trial, defendant told an incredible story. He tried to explain away the $100 he 
had received from Waldron by claiming that he happened to find it in the apartment (R. 
438). He justified this theft by saying, "It's money. Money. It's money" (R. 452). 
As for the bindle of cocaine found on him in the search, defendant claimed that Waldron 
had given it to him as he was leaving the apartment—"it was like a handshake"—and 
that he knew it was dope, but it took it because "it was for free" (R. 442-44). 
In sum, two officers overheard the drug transaction at a time when only defendant 
and Waldron were in the apartment, defendant later told Appleman that he had sold cocaine 
to Waldron, and defendant was found with money and cocaine on him when he was stopped 
immediately after the sale. 
In view of the overwhelming weight of incriminating evidence, defense counsel's 
failure to discover and disclose Waldron's forgery record, prison drug use, and early 
release and re-incarceration before trial are not "sufficient to undermine confidence in 
the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Templin, 805 P.2d at 187. This is especially 
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true where the most significant factor affecting his credibility—the letter of recommendation 
he was promised in exchange for his trial testimony—was disclosed at trial {see R. 379). 
Defendant has failed to establish prejudice, and thus his trial counsel's ineffectiveness, 
as a "demonstrable reality." Fernandez, 870 P.2d at 877. 
B. Any implication in defendant's brief that the prosecutor deliberately 
deceived the court is baseless. 
Without asserting a due process violation as such, defendant intimates that the 
prosecutor deliberately deceived the jury by presenting known false evidence at trial. 
See Br. Aplt. at 19-20. He cites Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 270 (1959); Pyle v. 
Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942); Campbell v. Reed, 594 F.2d 4, 7 (4th Cir. 1979); and United 
States v. Sutton, 542 F.2d 1239, 1242-43 (4th Cir. 1976). 
Obviously, the State is not free to present "false evidence, known to be such by 
representatives of the State,." or to permit such evidence "to go uncorrected when it 
appears." Napue, 360 U.S. at 269-70. 
In Napue, the prosecutor promised a key witness that if he would testify against 
Napue, a recommendation for reduction in his sentence would be "made, and, if possible, 
effectuated." Id. at 266 (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted). At trial, the 
prosecutor asked the witness, "Have I promised you that I would recommend any reduction 
of sentence to anybody?" The witness answered, "You did not." Id. at 267 n.2. After 
Napue was convicted, the prosecutor left government employment and filed an extraordinary 
18 
writ on behalf of the witness seeking to enforce the terms of the agreement he had earlier 
negotiated as a prosecutor. Id. at 266. The Supreme Court held that because "the false 
testimony used by the State . . . may have had an effect on the outcome of the trial," 
due process required reversal of Napue's conviction. Id. at 272. See also Giglio v. United 
States, 405 U.S. 150(1972). 
Nothing similar occurred here. At the beginning of Waldron's testimony the trial 
prosecutor asked him whether he was currently an inmate at the Utah State Prison and 
whether he had been an inmate on 14 March 1992 (the date of the crime); Waldron answered 
affirmatively to both questions (R. 374). Nothing in the record contradicts this testimony. 
The prosecutor asked nothing about any consideration offered to Waldron for testifying 
(R. 374-78). 
On cross-examination, defense counsel asked why Waldron would involve himself 
in this "risky kind of project"; Waldron responded that "Mr. Leo said he'd write me a 
good recommendation to the Board" (R. 379). He added, "I was promised a letter. That 
was it" (R. 379). On cross-examination, Lucey was asked, "What was offered [Waldron] 
to engage in the activity that was discussed?" Lucey answered, "At that time he'd been 
guaranteed nothing but a recommendation to the Board of Pardons" (R. 254). Officer 
Lucey later stated that "the only compensation Waldron received fo[r] his role as a 
confidential informant was a letter of recommendation to the Board of Pardons that Waldron 
not lose his parole date as a result of a dirty urine test" (R. 787). Lucey also stated that 
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M[t]here were absolutely no promises or guarantees made to Mr. Waldron as to what the 
Board of Pardons and Paroles [sic] would do with this recommendation (Defendant's 
ex. 6). Again, nothing in the record contradicts Waldron's or Lucey's testimony. 
Defendant notes that, approximately two weeks after his arrest, and over ten months 
prior to Waldron's scheduled parole date, Waldron was paroled (R. 785-86). While the 
prosecutor did not elicit these facts at trial, neither did he contradict them. 
Moreover, no evidence suggests that Waldron knew or believed that he would be 
rewarded with early release for participating in the operation. A bargain of which the 
witness is unaware cannot affect his testimony. See Willhoite v. Vasquez, 921 F.2d 247, 
249-50 (9th Cir. 1990) (no error in not disclosing to jury prosecutor's agreement with 
witness's counsel to seek sentence reduction, where witness had no knowledge of deal). 
Hence, the record provides little reason to believe that Waldron's testimony or conduct 
was affected by the release. Moreover, the fact that Waldron was incarcerated at the 
time of trial (R. 374) means that Waldron had already received, and squandered, whatever 
benefit he had received from the Board. 
Finally, defendant cites no authority, and the State is aware of none, holding that 
a prosecutor has a duty to impeach his own witness with facts within his knowledge if 




THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PLAINLY ERR BY NOT SUA SPONTE 
SUPPRESSING DRUGS DISCOVERED ON DEFENDANT INCIDENT 
TO AN ARREST CONDUCTED BY CORRECTIONS OFFICERS, ON 
THE THEORY THAT THE OFFICERS LACKED STATUTORY 
AUTHORITY TO ARREST A DRUG DEALER NOT SUPPLYING 
DRUGS TO PRISON INMATES 
The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress the drugs and money found 
on his person on the ground that the search was incident to a legal arrest and thus 
constitutional (R. 285). 
Defendant attacks this ruling on the ground that the arrest was illegal. The DOC 
officers who arrested him "were acting outside the scope of their authority under Utah 
law," he argues, because "[n]othing in the record supports that Maestas was an intended 
target of the operation." Br. Aplt. at 34-35. The targets were "persons outside the 
correctional facility who were suspected of supplying drugs to inmates." Id. 
Defendant cites both state and federal constitutions, but does not seek "a distinct 
analysis under Art. I, § 14 [of the Utah Constitution]." Br. Aplt. at 33 n.2. Accordingly, 
no separate state constitutional claim is before this Court. State v. Mace, 921 P.2d 1372, 
1376 (Utah 1996) (citing State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 & n. 5 (Utah 1988), habeas 
corpus granted on other grounds, Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir.1991). 
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A. This claim was not preserved. 
This claim was not preserved at trial. Defendant claims that ff[t]he defense in this 
case raised the issue of the legality of the arrest in the trial court prior to re-sentencing. 
(Case No. 950902479 at 160-62.)." Br. Aplt. at 45. The "trial court" defendant refers 
to was the post-conviction court hearing his petition for post-conviction relief: the complete 
case number in that case included a "habeas corpus" designation: 950902479 HC (see 
HC: 160-62). 
Defendant thus raised this issue for the first time in his 1995 postconviction 
proceeding, some three years after the court's ruling. A motion to suppress evidence 
must be raised at least five days before trial. Utah R. Crim. P. 12(b)(2). His assertion 
of the claim of error was thus untimely. "A party who fails to make a clear and timely 
objection waives the right to raise the issue at the appellate level." State v. Matsamas, 
808 P.2d 1048, 1052 (Utah 1991) (referring to Utah R. Crim. P. 12(b)(2)). The claim 
is therefore waived. 
The post-conviction court did permit defendant to file a Motion for Arrest of Judgment 
or in the Alternative for a New Trial (HC: 160-62), and it stated that "if the motions 
are denied, they'll be preserved" (R. 690). However, the post-conviction court later 
informed defendant, "the options are: you're re-sentenced and you go to the Court of 
Appeals and lay out your issues, or you deal with it on the habeas side" (R. 736). In 
other words, the post-conviction court was willing to address defendant's claims in the 
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habeas context, but not if he defendant preferred to be re-sentenced for the purpose of 
bring an appeal, as he eventually did. 
Defendant claims that the post-conviction court committed error in failing to address 
this issue. Br. Aplt. at 45. On the contrary, it lacked authority to do so: "Once a trial 
court on habeas review determines that a defendant has been denied the constitutional 
right to appeal, a direct appeal should be provided immediately, without adjudication 
of any other claims, such as ineffective assistance of counsel." State v. Gordon, 913 
P.2d 350, 357 (Utah 1996) (quoting State v. Hallett, 856 P.2d 1060, 1062 (Utah 1993), 
overruling State v. Rowlings, 829 P.2d 150, 154 (Utah App. 1992)). Considering claims 
other than the denial of the right to appeal ffviolate[s] the principle that a habeas proceeding 
is not a substitute for an appeal." Hallett, 856 P.2d at 1062. Because the post-conviction 
court here re-sentenced defendant for purposes of appeal, it lacked authority to adjudicate 
any other claims. 
Defendant acknowledges that this Court may determine that the issue was not 
preserved, and so appropriately argues the claim under ineffective assistance and plain 
error. See Br. Aplt. at 45. 
B. The corrections officers acted within the scope of their statutory 
authority in arresting defendant 
Factual background. Officer Lucey testified at the suppression hearing that the 
original targets of the investigation were persons "involved within [the Utah State Prison] 
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who'd been using this informant to mule narcotics into the facility . . . and their agents 
on the street'1 (R. 255-56). The plan was for Waldron to attempt to contact approximately 
four to five potential suppliers (R. 385).7 
On the day in question, Waldron (the confidential informant) and Gabaldon (the 
undercover agent) told Jeanette Appleman and Patricia Chacon that they were in the market 
for drugs and sought their assistance in locating suppliers (R. 233). Appleman attempted 
to locate a supplier by walking to a pay phone and placing several calls that "had nothing 
to do with [defendant]" (R. 239). However, while waiting for the supplier to return the 
page, Appleman mentioned to Gabaldon that defendant "sold cocaine, and she'd be able 
to get some from him if she could locate him11 (R. 234). 
7
 In challenging the trial court's pretrial denial of his motion to suppress, defendant cites 
to both the suppression hearing and the trial. See, e.g., Br. Aplt. at 34. 
Although Utah has no explicit rule, most appellate courts, in reviewing the denial of 
a pretrial motion to suppress evidence, will consider only evidence before the court at the 
suppression hearing. See, e.g., United States v. Hicks, 978 F.2d 722, 724-25 (D.C. Cir. 
\992);Baezv. State, 425 S.E.2d885, 890(Ga. App. 1992); State v. Ryder, 315N.W.2d786, 
788-89 (Iowa 19*2); Aiken v. State, 647 A.2d 1229,1232 (Md. App. 1994), cert, denied, 651 
A.2d854(Md. 1995); Commonwealth v. Powers, 398 A.2d 1013,1014 (Pa. 1979); 4 Wayne 
R. LaFave, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 11.1(c) (1996). 
Some appellate courts will consider both pretrial and trial evidence in reviewing a 
pretrial ruling. However, courts endorsing this rule generally do so in the context of 
affirming the trial court's pretrial ruling. See, e.g., United States v. Muniz, 1 F.3d 1018, 
1021-22 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 114 S. Ct. 575 (1993); United States v. Martin, 982 F.2d 
1236, 1239-40 n.2 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Basey, 816 F.2d 980, 983 n.l (5th Cir. 
1987); State v. Young, 576So.2d 1048,1054 n.l, 1055 (La. Ct App. \99\); State v. Duncan, 
879 S.W.2d 749,751 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994). Contra State v. Kong, 883 P.2d 686,688 (Hawaii 
Ct.App. 1994) (reversal). 
The principle unifying these cases is that an appellate court may affirm, but not 
reverse, a ruling based on evidence not before the trial court at the time it ruled. 
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Meanwhile, defendant had already shown up on his own with cocaine to sell and 
independently sold some to Waldron (R. 235, 238). Although defendant and Waldron 
apparently did not discuss whether the drugs would end up in the prison, defendant knew 
that Waldron was only out on a "home visit" (R. 267, 376-77). In fact, Waldron told 
defendant that he knew people in prison that defendant also knew (R. 452). 
In short, defendant, sniffing a quick sale, stepped unbidden into a snare set for 
others. 
Analysis. Under 1991 Utah law,8 Department of Corrections (DOC) was required 
to "provide probation supervision programs, parole supervision programs, correctional 
facilities, community correctional centers, and other programs or facilities as necessary 
and as required to accomplish its purposes." UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-13-10 (Supp. 1991). 
Some of the activities included in the DOC's primary purposes were listed in UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 64-13-6 (Supp. 1991): 
The primary purposes of the Department of Corrections include: 
(1) protection of the public through institutional care and confinement, 
and supervision in the community of offenders where appropriate; 
(2) implementation of court-ordered punishment of offenders; 
(3) provision of program opportunities for offenders; 
(4) management of programs to take into account the needs and interests 
of victims, where reasonable; and 
(5) supervision of probationers and parolees as directed by statute and 
implemented by the courts and Board of Pardons. 
8
 All code citations are to the versions in effect on the date of defendant's arrest. Many 
of the code sections have been substantially amended since that time. See, e.g., UTAH CODE 
ANN. §64-13-6 (1996). 
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(Emphasis added). Defendant paraphrases the prefatory language in this statute as follows: 
"Section 64-13-6 recognized that the 'primary purposes' of the DOC were . . . " Br. Aplt. 
at 35 (emphasis added). However, were and include are not equivalent terms here: were 
implies the list is exhaustive; include makes clear that it is merely illustrative. See, e.g., 
State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 539, 545 (Utah 1983) (the word "including" preceding a list 
"indicates that the list is illustrative, not exhaustive") (quoting State v. Forsyth, 641 P.2d 
1172, 1175 (Utah 1982)). The list is thus illustrative, not exhaustive. 
In addition, the section's reference to DOC's "primary" purposes implies the existence 
of unspecified secondary purposes. Among these secondary purposes is the preparation 
of presentence diagnostic evaluation and investigation reports, a function performed by 
DOC, see UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-13-20 (Supp. 1991), but not mentioned in UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 64-13-6 (Supp. 1991). 
As for the authority of the agents in question here, UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-13-8 
(Supp. 1991) provides, "The department shall designate by policy which of its employees 
have the authority and powers of peace officers, the power to administer oaths, and other 
powers the department considers appropriate, including but not limited to the responsibility 
to bear firearms" (emphasis added).9 
9
 A "peace officer" was defined as "any employee of a police or law enforcement agency 
which is part of or administered by the state or any of its political subdivisions, and whose 
duties consist primarily of the prevention and detection of crime and the enforcement of 
criminal statutes or ordinances of this state or any of its political subdivisions." UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 77-la-1(a) (Supp. 1991). The authority of peace officers employed by the DOC "is 
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Thus, the duties of DOC were not "specifically limited" by these sections, as defendant 
contends. See Br. Aplt. at 36. Rather, the statutes give examples of DOC's "primary" 
purposes, leave other primary purposes and most secondary purposes unspecified, and 
authorize DOC to bestow upon its employees the authority and powers of peace officers 
and "other powers the department considers appropriate." UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-13-8 
(Supp. 1991). Thus, unlike the statute circumscribing a peace officer's territorial authority 
at issue in State v. Fixel 744 P.2d 1366 (Utah 1987), UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-13-6 (Supp. 
1991) was not "meant to encompass the total spectrum of a police officer's acts and 
authority." Fixel 744 P.2d at 1368. 
It is thus far from clear that DOC officers were not authorized "to conduct criminal 
investigations or operations outside correctional facilities," as defendant asserts. Br. 
Aplt. at 37. Managing the care and incarceration of offenders entails excluding contraband 
from the prison. If the contraband is flowing in from known outside sources, it follows 
that a "secondary" function of DOC officers invested with the powers of peace officers 
might well be to interdict that flow. 
Defendant also argues that "at the time that correctional officers diverted from 
their intended operation, they were acting outside the scope of their authority under Utah 
law." Br. Aplt at 35. This argument suggests that even if the DOC agents were authorized 
regulated by title 64, Chapter 13, Department of Corrections - State Prison." UTAH CODE 
ANN. §77-1 a-1 (Supp. 1991). 
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to conduct a sting of dealers known to be supplying drugs to the prison, they exceeded 
their authority when they turned their focus to defendant. 
First, defendant at least arguably fit the profile of the suppliers the agents were 
targeting. When he sold the cocaine to Waldron he was on notice that Waldron was 
a prisoner out on home release (see R. 376-77). It was therefore at least reasonably 
foreseeable that a portion of the cocaine would find its way into the prison. 
Second, the agents did not divert their focus; defendant stepped into it. They went 
to the apartment of a person known to be connected with dealers supplying drugs to the 
prison and indicated they were in the market for drugs. For obvious reasons, they did 
not state that they were willing to buy drugs only from someone supplying drugs to the 
prison. While Appleman and Chacon were attempting to contact suppliers, defendant 
appeared unbidden with drugs to sell. Defendant implies that the DOC agents should 
at that point have refused to buy drugs from him. However, the agents were not required 
to ignore defendant's criminal conduct. Cf State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48, 51 (1981) ("an 
officer is not expected to ignore what is exposed to observation from a position where 
he is lawfully entitled to be"). 
In sum, the agents acted within their statutory authority in arresting defendant when 
he showed up on the scene and offered to commit a felony. 
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C. Assuming arguendo the corrections officers acted outside the scope 
of their statutory authority, defendant is not entitled to the remedy 
of suppression. 
Fourth Amendment Defendant claims that M[s]ince the warrantless, unlawful 
arrest served as the basis for justifying the warrantless search, the exclusionary rule is 
appropriate as a remedy." Br. Aplt. at 39. Defendant asserts "this issue on appeal as 
a Fourth Amendment violation, and he specifically is challenging the validity of the arrest 
as the basis for the search." Id. He seeks a per se rule excluding the fruits of a search 
incident to an arrest unlawful under any state law. See Br. Aplt. at 40. 
Defendant's argument fails on the law. It is true enough that, in order to support 
a search under the Fourth Amendment, an arrest must be lawful: "It is the fact of the 
lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search . .." United States v. Robinson, 
414 U.S. 218,235(1973). 
However, the lawfulness of the arrest for Fourth Amendment purposes is measured, 
not against state law, but against federal constitutional standards: "[t]he fact that the arrest, 
search, or seizure may have violated state law is irrelevant as long as the standards 
developed under the Federal Constitution were not offended." United States v. Le, 1999 
WL 176192, *4 (10th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States 
v. Wright, 16 F.3d 1429, 1437 (6th Cir. 1994)). See also United States v. Miller, 452 
F.2d 731, 733 (10th Cir. 1971) ("we are not concerned with the validity of the arrests 
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[by city police officers] and seizures measured by Oklahoma law, but rather . . . by federal 
standards"). 
Other jurisdictions concur in this view. See, e.g., Abbott v. City of Crocker, Missouri, 
30 F.3d 994, 997-98 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that district court erred as a matter of law 
in ruling "that the arrest in violation of state law necessarily also constituted a violation 
of the Fourth Amendment"); United States v. Gilbert, 942 F.2d 1537, 1542 (11th Cir. 
1991) (although the "search may not have complied with certain conditions required by 
the state, it did not offend any constitutional principles that support the suppression of 
evidence"); People v. Martinez, 898 P.2d 28, 31 (Colo. 1995) (en banc) (otherwise 
reasonable search incident to extraterritorial—and therefore statutorily unauthorized—arrest 
did not violate constitution); Commonwealth v. Lyons, 492 N.E.2d 1142, 1145 (Mass. 
Sup. Ct. 1986) (holding that the fact that evidence was obtained in search incident to 
arrest under warrant issued in violation of state statute "does not by itself require 
suppression"); State v. John, 639 A.2d 1062, 1064 (Me. 1994) (Fourth Amendment does 
not require per se exclusion of evidence obtained in search incident to arrest based on 
probable cause but unauthorized under state statute); City of Kettering v. Hollen, 416 
N.E.2d 598, 600 (Ohio 1980) ("the fruits of the [extraterritorial] arrest of the defendant, 
based on probable cause but unauthorized under existing state law, are not suppressive" 
under Fourth Amendment); Commonwealth v. Saul, 499 A.2d 358, 361 (Pa. Super. 1985) 
(suppression of evidence seized by officer conducting drug sting outside geographical 
30 
scope of his authority, in violation of state statute, would be "remedy all out of proportion"); 
cf Commonwealth v. Kiner, 697 A.2d 262, 269 (Pa. 1997) (evidence obtained in search 
incident to arrest effected by trooper out of uniform must be suppressed). 
United States v. Bell, 54 F.3d 502 (8th Cir. 1995) illustrates this rule on facts analogous 
to those at bar. City police officers stopped Bell, a gang member, while he was riding 
a bicycle after midnight near a bar known to be the source of drug deliveries. Id. at 503. 
After brief questioning, the officers arrested Bell for operating a bicycle without a headlight 
in violation of Iowa law. Id. A search incident to arrest yielded 14.8 grams of cocaine 
base. Id. The district court suppressed the cocaine on the ground that, under Iowa law, 
the officers were authorized to issue Bell a citation, but not to arrest him and, consequently, 
that the cocaine could not be validly seized incident to Bell's arrest. Id. 
The Eighth Circuit reversed: "we do not think Fourth Amendment analysis requires 
reference to an arrest's legality under state law. An arrest by state officers is reasonable 
in the Fourth Amendment sense if it is based on probable cause." Id. at 504 (citations 
omitted). 
This conclusion accords with the Supreme Court's language in Robinson: "A custodial 
arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth 
Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional 
justification." Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235. This sentence "seems to say that 'lawful' 
refers not to the limitations of state law but rather to an overarching principle that all 
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it takes to make a custodial arrest reasonable in a Fourth Amendment sense is that it 
be based on probable cause." 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURES 1.5(b) (1996). 
Defendant does not claim that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest him or 
that the arrest and search were unreasonable in any sense except that "at the time that 
correctional officers diverted from their intended operation, they were acting outside 
the scope of their authority under Utah law." See Br. Aplt. at 35. Therefore, the arrest 
and the search incident to it did not violate the Fourth Amendment as defendant contends. 
State law. Defendant also claims that State v. Fixel, 744 P.2d 1366 (Utah 1987) 
required suppression of the evidence derived from the search. See Br. Aplt. at 40-41. 
Utah cases uniformly hold that mere violation of a rule of criminal procedure does 
not require suppression. See, e.g., State v. Rowe, 850 P.2d 427, 429 (Utah 1992); State 
v. Buck 756 P.2d 700, 702-03 (Utah 1988); Fixel, 744 P.2d at 1368-69; State v. Ribe, 
876 P.2d 403, 410-11 (Utah App. 1994); State v. Simmons, 866 P.2d 614, 617-18 (Utah 
App. 1993). 
Fixel involved a police officer who effected a controlled drug buy outside his 
geographical jurisdiction. Id. at 1367. In so doing, he "clearly acted outside the scope 
of his statutory authority" and committed a "violation of the law." Id. at 1368, 1369. 
Fixel argued that this illegality required suppression, although he did not rely on federal 
constitutional law. Id. at 1367-68. 
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The Utah Supreme Court ruled that suppression "would be a remedy out of all 
proportion to the benefits gained to the end of obtaining justice while preserving individual 
liberties unimpaired." Id. at 1369 (quoting Commonwealth v. Mason, 490 A.2d 421, 
426 (Pa. 1985). The court stated that n[o]nly a 'fundamental' violation of [a rule of criminal 
procedure] requires automatic suppression, and a violation is 'fundamental' only where 
it, in effect, renders the search unconstitutional under traditional fourth amendment 
standards." Fixel, 744 P.2d at 1368 (bracketed material in original) (quoting Mason, 
490 A.2d at 426). A non-fundamental violation requires suppression only where "(1) 
there was 'prejudice' in the sense that the search might not have occurred or would not 
have been so abrasive if the [r]ule had been followed, or (2) there is evidence of intentional 
and deliberate disregard of a provision of the [r]ule." Id. (quoting Mason, 490 A.2d at 
426). Even then, "exclusion may be an appropriate remedy." Id. at 1369 (quoting Mason, 
490 A.2d at 426). 
Here, the alleged violation was not prejudicial. Courts generally ignore geographical 
or other technical limits on an officer's jurisdiction in considering the propriety of exclusion. 
See authorities cited above. Assuming arguendo that DOC agents acted outside their 
statutory authority in arresting defendant, that technical violation "had nothing to do with 
the extent of the intrusion on defendant's privacy." Buck, 756 P.2d at 703. Accordingly, 
"the officers' conduct was not unreasonable, and the trial court did not err in refusing 
to suppress the evidence seized." Id. 
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Defendant points to no facts that would establish prejudice "in the sense that the 
search might not have occurred or would not have been so abrasive," Pixel, 744 P.2d 
at 1368, if local police had effected it. He asserts that no "local law agency . . . would 
have approved the undercover operation," Br. Aplt. at 41, but this is mere speculation. 
Nor has defendant demonstrated any "intentional or deliberate disregard" of the 
statutes he cites. He relies solely on the fact that the agents knew that defendant was 
not an original target of the operation. See Br. Aplt. at 44. Any inference of bad faith 
is negated, however, by three facts: (1) as explained above, the statutes setting forth DOC 
agents' authority did not clearly forbid the operation; (2) defendant thrust himself into 
the drug sting; and (3) defendant knew he was selling to a prisoner out for a brief home 
visit. See pp. 6-8, 24-25 herein. 
In short, defendant has failed to demonstrate that either Fourth Amendment law 
or state rules of criminal procedure require suppression of the drugs and money found 
on his person. A fortiori, he cannot demonstrate plain error or ineffective assistance 
of counsel here. 
D. The trial court did not commit plain error by not sua sponte 
asserting this dubious claim. 
Because defendant did not timely assert his challenge to the search, he must on 
appeal demonstrate "plain error, meaning that error was obvious and substantially 
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prejudicial." State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, f 56 (Utah 1999) (citing State v. JDww, 850 
P.2d 1201, 1224 (Utah 1993)). 
"Utah courts have repeatedly held that a trial court's error is not plain where there 
is no settled appellate law to guide the trial court." State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 239 
(Utah App. 1997) (citations omitted). Defendant has not demonstrated, or even attempted 
to demonstrate, any "settled appellate law" supporting his claim. Although he asserts 
a Fourth Amendment violation, he cites no factually relevant Fourth Amendment law. 
See Br. Aplt. at 32-34. He places primary reliance on Fixel State v. Rowe, 850 P.2d 
427 (Utah 1992); State v. Simmons, 866 P.2d 614 (Utah App. 1993); and Buck, see id 
at 39-44, all non-constitutional decisions affirming the challenged convictions. Moreover, 
as demonstrated above, the statutes governing the authority of DOC agents did not obviously 
forbid the agents' actions in this case. 
Defendant notes that in the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress, the court 
asked a number of questions about why the DOC was involved in such an operation and 
defendant's knowledge that the drugs might end up in prison. See Br. Aplt. at 46-47. 
Furthermore, at the conclusion of the hearing the court stated to the prosecutor: "Can 
you hold those officers out there, and can I speak to you generally in my office about 
the Department of Corrections and the manner in which they go about these things?" 
(R. 287). However, there is no record of the in-chambers discussion. Defendant speculates 
that the conversation concerned the very point he now presses. See Br. Aplt at 47. Perhaps 
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it did, in which case the court probably reviewed the relevant statutes and reached the 
conclusion that they did not clearly prohibit DOC from conducting the operation. 
Moreover, assuming arguendo that defendant had established obvious error, the 
error was not "substantially prejudicial," Bakalov, 1999 UT at | 56, for reasons stated 
in point II.C. above. 
E. Trial counsel was not ineffective for not asserting this dubious claim. 
Counsel's failure "to make motions or objections which would be futile if raised 
does not constitute ineffective assistance." State v. Codianna, 660 P.2d 1101, 1109 (Utah 
1983) (quoting State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56, 58 (Utah 1982)). Nor does an attorney 
perform outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance by not objecting 
to evidence that is "arguably admissible." Chatham v. State, 889 S.W.2d 345, 352-53 
(Tex. App. 1994). Moreover, "if an error was not obvious to the trial court, it most likely 
was not obvious to trial counsel." State v. Hall 946 P.2d 712, 720 (Utah App. 1997), 
cert, denied, 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1998). "It follows that the failure of counsel to object 
to an alleged error that is not readily apparent cannot constitute an objectively deficient 
performance." Id. (quoting State v. Saunders, 893 P.2d 584, 592 (Utah Ct. App.), cert 
granted, 910 P.2d 425 (Utah 1995)).10 
10
 Thus, defendant's assertion that counsel's non-objection forced him "to argue plain error 
on appeal," Br. Aplt. at 48, though true enough, leads nowhere. 
36 
For reasons stated in points ILB., C, and D. above, any possible error here was 
not obvious. Therefore, especially in view of the "strong presumption that counsel's 
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance," Taylor, 947 
P.2d at 685, defendant has failed to establish his counsel's deficient performance as "a 
demonstrable reality." Fernandez, 870 P.2d at 877. 
Likewise, plain error and ineffective assistance claims share "a common standard" 
of prejudice. State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting State v. 
Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 124 n.15 (Utah 1989)). For reasons stated in point II.C. herein, 
any deficient performance here was not prejudicial. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT DEFENDANT WILLFULLY 
VIOLATED THE CONDITIONS OF HIS PROBATION IS NOT 
AGAINST THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE 
Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking defendant's 
probation, since "the facts fail to support the trial court's findings that [defendant] willfully 
violated probation." Br. Aplt. at 24 (capitalization, underscoring, and boldface omitted). 
Mootness. Apparently, defendant has since been released on parole (see addendum 
D).u Substantial authority suggests that this release does not moot his challenge to his 
parole revocation because lingering "collateral legal consequences" of the revocation 
1 {The attached document, which indicates defendant's release on parole, is not part of the 
record on appeal and is attached for the information of the Court only. 
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persist. United States v. Reider, 103 F.3d 99, 101 (10th Cir. 1996); see also Larsen v. 
Jorgensen, 862 P.2d 1382, 1383-84 (Utah App. 1993) (challenge to parole date not mooted 
by inmate's subsequent release on parole); but see Vandenberg v. Rodgers, 801 F.2d 
377, 378 (10th Cir. 1986) (inmate's parole mooted his challenge to delay of parole date). 
Such potential collateral consequences identified by courts include the record of the 
revocation, which could adversely affect future parole and sentencing decisions, Reider, 
103 F.3d at 100, and the fact that existing restraints on freedom "would potentially terminate 
earlier if [the defendant] had been paroled earlier." Larsen, 862 P.2d at 1383-84. The 
State thus does not claim that defendant's challenge is moot. 
Relief. However, even assuming defendant prevails on this claim, the relief available 
to him is limited. He asserts that "[tjhis case should be reversed" on the ground that 
"[t]he trial court abused its discretion in terminating [defendant's] probation." Br. Aplt. 
at 32. The remedy, if any, to which defendant is entitled is vacation of the revocation 
order. See, e.g., Reider, 103 F.3d at 103 (remanding with instructions to vacate the 
revocation order and dismissing revocation petition with prejudice). Accordingly, only 
the efficacy of the revocation order, not the underlying conviction, is at stake in this point. 
Proceedings below. One condition of defendant's probation was that he "complete 
the Odyssey House and Aftercare (R. 106). After AP&P filed a "Progress/Violation 
Report" (R. 110), the trial court held a hearing on its order to show cause why defendant's 
probation should not be revoked (R. 612). 
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Defendant was admitted to Odyssey House on 2 June 1994 and involuntarily removed 
from the program on 24 June 1994 (R. 613). Upon his admission, defendant was informed 
of the rules all residents are required to comply with in order to remain in the program 
(R. 614-15). 
Problems arose with defendant (R 615). He had "difficulty with his impulse control" 
and "got escalated on two or three occasions" (R. 615). The first occurred at an Odyssey 
House activity in a park (R. 627). Defendant said that his ex-wife lived across the street 
from the park, and he became "very emotional over it" (R. 627). Back at Odyssey House, 
defendant continued to escalate, until clinician Albert Nieto decided to "run a group with 
him and try to de-escalate the situation, and so that his peers could be aware of what 
was going on with [defendant]" (R. 628). Defendant made comments about wanting 
to hurt himself and indicated "that if he got out he was going to assault his ex-wife" (R. 
616,628). 
Odyssey House put him on suicide watch (R. 615, 628). However, it "is not a 
psychiatric facility" and is "not set up 24 hours a day with doctors," so a 24-hour suicide 
watch was "difficult to do" (R. 615). Nieto took defendant to the University of Utah 
Medical Center emergency room because of his ideation "about hurting himself, running 
in[to] the street, letting someone run over him" (R. 616). He was seen by a physician 
about his complaint of stomach ulcers and by a psychiatrist, then discharged (R. 629). 
He returned to Odyssey House and "the ideation continued" (R. 630). 
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According to clinical director Tracy Anderson, Odyssey House has "basically four 
cardinal rules," and "the issue around suicide acting out or ideation is very clear" (R. 
613, 616). Anderson personally explained to defendant that if his behavior continued 
"he would not be able to stay in the program" (R. 616-17). Defendant did, Anderson 
testified, "have the ability to comply with the rules" of Odyssey House (R. 621). 
The trial court found a violation of the conditions of probation, and that the "violation 
was knowing and intentional under circumstances where the defendant had the ability 
to comply with the Court's order on the conditions of probation" (R. 653). Accordingly, 
the court revoked probation (R. 653). 
Controlling principles. "Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing 
in court and a finding that the conditions of probation have been violated." UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 77-18-l(12)(aXH) (Supp. 1994). Although "fault is not necessary in every instance 
of probation revocation,... as a general rule, in order to revoke probation for the violation 
of a condition of probation not involving the payment of money, the violation must be 
willful or, if not willful, must presently threaten the safety of society." State v. Hodges, 
798 P.2d 270, 276-77 (Utah App. 1990). If "the court finds that appellant's failure to 
progress at an adequate rate resulted from problems beyond his control, his probation 
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cannot be revoked unless it is also found that, because of this failure, appellant poses 
a present danger to others." Id. at 277.12 
In this context, the term "willful" does not equate "with the word intentional as 
it is often used in other criminal contexts." State v. Archuleta, 812 P.2d 80, 84 (Utah 
App. 1991). Rather, a finding of willfulness "merely requires a finding that the probationer 
did not make bona fide efforts to meet the conditions of his probation." Id. at 84 (footnote 
omitted). 
In the trial court, the State bears the burden of establishing a probation violation 
by a preponderance of the evidence. Hodges, 798 P.2d at 278. However, on appeal, 
the burden is upon defendant to demonstrate that the court's finding is "against the clear 
weight of the evidence" when that evidence is "viewed in a light most favorable to the 
trial court's findings." State v. Martinez, 811 P.2d 205, 208, 208 n.4 (Utah App. 1991) 
(emphasis omitted). 
Analysis. Viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's finding, the testimony 
elicited below supports the trial court's finding. That finding was therefore not entered, 
as defendant contends, in "the absence of any facts to support the determination that 
[defendant] willfully violated Odyssey House rules." Br. Aplt. at 29. 
12
 Willfulness need not be shown if the probation agreement includes a condition that the 
offender "make adequate progress in treatment, regardless of fault." Hodges, 798 P.2d at 
278. The instant probation contained no such term. 
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Tracy Anderson, clinical director of the Odyssey House Program, testified from 
his observation that defendant did "have the ability to comply with the rules" of Odyssey 
House (R. 613, 621). Defendant had no history of psychotic behavior, and his thinking 
patterns were well within the range of a resident at Odyssey House (R. 622). Asked 
if defendant "could be a patient in the Oddessy [sic] House program,... could satisfy 
the regulations that you imposed," Anderson responded, "I think he was capable of doing 
that" (R. 623). 
As for defendant's suicide threats or gestures, defendant asserts that Anderson "stated 
that he considered the suicide threat to be 'rear and that it was 'a serious affair.' (R. 
616)." Br. Aplt. at 27. Here is what Anderson stated: "Like any other mental health 
person, I have to take every suicide gesture and threat as real. So, yeah, it's a serious 
affair" (R. 616). Anderson's meaning was clear: however skeptical he might have been, 
he had to treat defendant's suicide threat as though it were real. Anderson added, "I 
told [defendant] if he continued that behavior that he would not be able to stay at Oddessy 
[sic] House" (R. 617). Obviously, this warning was inconsistent with a belief that defendant 
had no control over his gesturing and consistent with a belief that defendant had the ability 
to comply with the rules of the program. 
No one testified that defendant was unable to comply with the rules of Odyssey 
House. For example, no one testified that defendant was unable to control his rage upon 
viewing his ex-wife's house across the street from the park where the Odyssey House 
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residents were picnicking {see R. 627). Nor did any witness opine that defendant's threat 
to assault his ex-wife "if he got out" (R. 616) resulted from "problems beyond his control." 
Hodges, 798 P.2d at 277. On the contrary, clinician Albert Nieto testified that defendant 
"didn't want to hear what was being said to him" (R. 628). 
The following testimony from Nieto, elicited by the trial court, is also relevant: 
Q. Did you perceive any of Mr. Maestas's acting out as being 
manipulative? 
A. I would say that at first, I would say so, yes. As it continued, 
I would have to say no. 
Q. And is that because after he initially began it he then found himself 
in such a frenzy? Would that be a fair statement? 
A. You're — regarding his escalation and his — yes. Yes. 
(R. 632-33). Nieto here opines in effect that defendant's misconduct was originally 
manipulative, but that this manipulative behavior worked defendant into such a frenzy 
that his further misconduct was caused more by that frenzy than by any intent to 
manipulate—hardly a description of a probationer making "bona fide efforts to meet the 
conditions of his probation." Archuleta, 812 P.2d at 84 (footnote omitted). 
From these and other facts presented at the hearing, a judge could reasonably infer 
that defendant was not making bona fide efforts to comply with the requirements of the 
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64-13-1 STATE INSTITUTIONS 
64-13-1. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Community correctional center" means a nonsecure correctional 
facility operated by the department. 
(2) "Correctional facility" means any facility operated by the depart-
ment to house offenders, either in a secure or nonsecure setting. 
(3) "Council" means the Corrections Advisory Council. 
(4) "Department" means the Department of Corrections. 
(5) "Emergency" means any riot, disturbance, homicide, inmate vio-
lence occurring in any correctional facility, or any situation that presents 
immediate danger to the safety, security, and control of the department. 
(6) "Executive director" means the executive director of the Depart-
ment of Corrections. 
(7) "Inmate" means any person who is committed to the custody of the 
department and who is housed at a correctional facility or at a county jail 
at the request of the department. 
(8) "Offender" means any person who has been convicted of a crime for 
which he may be committed to the custody of the department and is at 
least one of the following: 
(a) c >mmitted to the custody of the department; 
(b) on probation; or 
(c) on parole. 
(9) "Secure correctional facility" means any prison, penitentiary, or 
other institution operated by the department or under contract for the 
confinement of offenders, where force may be used to restrain them if they 
attempt to leave the institution without authorization. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-1, enacted by L. tions (1) and (2) as present Subsections (4) and 
1985, ch. 198, § 1; 1987, ch. 116, § 1; 1989, (5). 
ch. 224, § 1. The 1989 amendment, effective April 24, 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- 1989, added present Subsection (5) and redes-
ment added present Subsections (1), (2) and (6) ignated former Subsections (5) to (8) as Subsec-
through (8), and redesignated former Subsec- tions (6) to (9). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — State prisoner's right to personally feet of Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons 
appear at civil trial to which he is a party— Act, 42 USCS §§ 1997-1997J, 93 A.L.R. Fed. 
state court cases, 82 A.L.R.4th 1063. 706. 
Validity, construction, application, and ef-
64-13-2. Creation of department. 
There is created a Department of Corrections, under the general supervi-
sion of the executive director of the department. The department is the state 
authority for corrections and assumes all powers and responsibilities formerly 
vested in the Board of Corrections and the Division of Corrections in the 
Department of Human Services. 
History: C. 1963, 64-13-2, enacted by L. ment, effective April 23, 1990, substituted 
1986, ch. 198, i 2; 1990, ch. 183, 5 47. "Human Services" for "Social Services'* at the 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend- end of the second sentence. 
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DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS — STATE PRISON 64-13-' 
64-13-3. Executive director, 
(1) The executive director shall be appointed by the governor with the ad 
vice and consent of the Senate. 
(2) The executive director shall be experienced and knowledgeable in th< 
field of corrections and shall have training in criminology and penology. 
(3) The governor shall establish the executive director's salary within th< 
salary range fixed by the Legislature in Chapter 22, Title 67, State Office 
Compensation. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-3, enacted by L. ment, effective July 1, 1991, added Subsectioi 
1986, ch. 198, § 3; 1991, ch. 114, § 20. (3). 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-
64-13-6. Purposes of department. 
The primary purposes of the Department of Corrections include: 
(1) protection of the public through institutional care and conflnemenl 
and supervision in the community of offenders where appropriate; 
(2) implementation of court-ordered punishment of offenders; 
(3) provision of program opportunities for offenders; 
(4) management of programs to take into account the needs and intei 
ests of victims, where reasonable; and 
(5) supervision of probationers and parolees as directed by statute an 
implemented by the courts and Board of Pardons. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-6, enacted by L. habitat ion" and "for offenders'* for "to assi 
1985, ch. 211, § 1; 1987, ch. 116, § 2. the criminal offender in functioning as a lai 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- abiding and productive member of society" 
ment substituted "purposes'* for "purpose** and Subsection (3); deleted former Subsection (<t 
"include'* for "includes the following" in the in- which read "individualized treatment of the ( 
troductory language; inserted "of offenders" in fender; and"; redesignated former Subsecti< 
Subsection (1); substituted "offenders" for "the (5) as present Subsection (4); made punctu 
criminal offender for the purpose of maintain- tion changes and added "and" to the end, 
ing a law-abiding and productive society" in Subsection (4); and added present Subsecti* 
Subsection (2); substituted "program" for "re- (5). 
64-13-7. Offenders in custody of department. 
All offenders committed for incarceration in a state correctional facility, f 
supervision on probation or parole, or for evaluation, shall be placed in tl 
custody of the department. The department shall establish procedures and 
responsible for the appropriate assignment or transfer of public offenders 
facilities or programs. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-7, enacted by L. ment substituted "correctional" for "prison" 
1985, ch. 211, § 2; 1987, ch. 116, § 3. the first sentence. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
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64-13-7.5 STATE INSTITUTIONS 
64-13-7.5. Persons in need of mental health services — 
Contracts. 
(1) Except as provided for in Subsection (2), when the department deter-
mines that a person in its custody is in need of mental health services, the 
department shall contract with the Division of Mental Health, local mental 
health authorities, or the state hospital to provide mental health services for 
that person. Those services may be provided at the Utah State Hospital or in 
community programs provided by or under contract with the Division of Men-
tal Health, a local mental health authority, or other public or private mental 
health care providers. 
(2) If the Division of Mental Health, a local mental health authority, or the 
state hospital notifies the department that it is unable to provide mental 
health services under Subsection (1), the department may contract with other 
public or private mental health care providers to provide mental health ser-
vices for persons in its custody. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-7.5, enacted by L. 
1989, ch. 245, * 5; 1991, ch. 193, $ 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-
ment, Tective April 29, 1991, added the Sub-
section (1) designation and added Subsection 
(2); substituted "Except as provided for in Sub-
section (2), when the department determines 
that a person in its custody is" for 'Tor persons 
in the custody of the department who the de-
A.L.R. — Probation officer's liability for 
negligent supervision of probationer, 44 
A.L.R.4th 638. 
partment has determined to be" and made a 
stylistic change in the first sentence in Subsec-
tion (1); and inserted "or other public or pri-
vate mental health care providers" and made 
related changes in the second sentence in Sub-
section (1). 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 245, § 8 
makes the act effective on July 1, 1989. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Right of state prison authorities to to prisoner without his or her consent—state 
administer neuroleptic or antipsychotic drugs cases, 75 A.L.R.4th 1124. 
64-13-8, Designation of employee powers. 
The department shall designate by policy which of its employees have the 
authority and powers of peace officers, the power to administer oaths, and 
other powers the department considers appropriate, including but not limited 
to the responsibility to bear firearms. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-8, enacted by L. substituted "its'* for "those'* and "considers'* for 
1985, ch. 211, § 3; 1987, ch. 116, § 4. "deems'' and inserted "authority and** in the 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- remaining sentence, 
ment deleted the former first sentence; and 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
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DEPARTMENT OF COKKEUT1UIN3 — a m i r , r i u o u n w-«-Aw-xvr.« 
64-13-9. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1987, ch. 116, § 28 repeals § 4, relating to department services to other 
§ 64-13-9, as enacted by Laws 1985, ch. 211, agencies, effective April 27, 1987. 
64-13-10. Department duties. 
The department shall provide probation supervision programs, parole su-
pervision programs, correctional facilities, community correctional centers, 
and other programs or facilities as necessary and as required to accomplish its 
purposes. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-10, enacted by L. and "necessary and as required to accomplish 
1985, ch. 211, § 5; 1987, ch. 116, § 5. its purposes" for "required for the safe manage-
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend* ment of public offenders/* 
ment substituted "correctional" for "prison" 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Constitutional right of prisoners 
to abortion services and facilities — federal 
cases, 90 A.L.R. Fed. 683. 
64-13-10.5. Education of persons in custody of Department 
of Corrections — Contracting for services — 
Transfer of supplies, equipment, furniture, and 
budget — Joint committee. 
(1) The State Board of Education is responsible for the education of persons 
in the custody of the Department of Corrections. 
(2) In order to fulfill this responsibility, the board shall, where feasible, 
contract with appropriate private or public agencies to provide educational 
and related administrative services. 
(3) All supplies, equipment, office furniture, and budget which were, before 
the effective date of this act, under the Department of Corrections, but, be-
cause of this act, will now come under the jurisdiction of the State Board oi 
Education, shall be transferred to the board as of the effective date of this act 
(4) A joint committee, including representatives of the board, the depart-
ment, and each agency referred to in Subsection (2), shall make recommenda-
tions to that agency concerning the personnel to be transferred as part of th< 
educational program. Those persons shall become employees of the agency ir 
accordance with procedures established by the board and the agency. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13*10.5, enacted by L. act / near the middle of Subsection (3), mean 
1987, ch. 157, § 2. Laws 1987, Chapter 157, which amended foi 
"Effective date of this act." — The term mer § 53-2-12.3 and enacted this section, 
"effective date of this act," in Subsection (3), Cross-References. — Responsibility for ecj 
means the effective date of Laws 1987, Chapter ucation of persons under 21 in custody of Dc 
157, which is April 27, 1987. partment of Human Services or in juvenile d« 
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Reserve and auxiliary officers. 






Basic training requirements for posi-
tion — Peace officers temporarily 
in the state 
Responsibility for training — Certi,-
fication 
Retirement. 
77-la-9. References in other provisions. 
77-la-l, Peace officer. 
(1) "Peace officer" means any employee of a police or law enforcement 
agency which is part of or administered by the state or any of its political 
subdivisions, and whose duties consist primarily of the prevention and detec-
tion of crime and the enforcement of criminal statutes or ordinances of this 
state or any of its political subdivisions. 
(a) "Peace officer" specifically includes the following: 
(i) any sheriff or deputy sheriff, police officer, or marshal of any 
county, city, or town; 
(ii) the commissioner of public safety and any swon* member of the 
Department of Public Safety; 
(iii) all persons specified in Section 23-20-1.5; 
(iv) any police officer employed by any college or university; 
(v) investigators for the Department of Motor Vehicle Business 
Administration; 
(vi) special agents or investigators for the attorney general and 
county attorneys; 
(vii) employees of the Department of Natural Resources desig-
nated as peace officers by law; and 
(viii) school district police officers as designated by the board of 
education for the school district. 
(b) Any police force established by a private college or university shall, 
prior to exercising its police power, apply to and be certified by the com-
missioner of public safety according to the rules of the Department of 
Public Safety. 
(2) Peace officers have statewide peace officer authority, but the authority 
extends to other counties, cities, or towns only when they are acting under 
Chapter 9, Title 77. This limitation does not apply to any peace officer em-
ployed by the state. 
(3) (a) Peace officers shall, prior to exercising peace officer authority, satis-
factorily complete the basic course at a certified peace officer training 
academy or pass a certification examination as provided in Section 
67-15-8, and be certified. 
(b) In addition, peace officers shall satisfactorily complete annual certi-
fied training of at least 40 hours per year as directed by the director of the 
Division of Peace Officer Standards and Training, with the advice and 
consent of the Council on Peace Officer Standards and Training. 
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1985, ch^ 174, § 3; 1987, ch. 69, § 9. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment rewrote Subsection (l)(a) so as to create 
Subsections (D(aMi) to (vni); substituted "and 
be certified by the commissioner of public 
safety according to" for "the commissioner of 
public safety and be certified by the commis-
Authority. 
—Undercover investigation. 
Subsection (2) of this section and * 77-9-3 
(territorial scope of authority) do not merely 
apply to the officially exercised acts of a uni-
formed police officer, but are meant to encom-
pass the total spectrum of an officer's acts and 
77-la-2. Correctional officer. 
History: C. 1953, 77-la-2, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 174, § 3. 
Compiler's Notes. — There is no Subsec-
tion (2)(a), as referred to in Subsection (2) 
section designations in bUDsecuou \oi, aim sub-
stituted "certification" for "waiver" in Subsec-
tion (3Ka). 
Cross-References. — Department of Public 
Safety, Chapter 13 of Title 41 
Natural Resources, Chapter 34 of Title 63 
Peace officer training, Chapter 15 of Title 67 
authority, including an authorized undercover 
investigation of a drug offense When an officer 
does not comply with these statutory require-
ments, however, the information need not be 
dismissed nor the evidence obtained as a result 
of the illegal investigation be suppressed State 
v. Fixel, 744 P.2d 1366 (Utah 1987). 
Cross-References. — Department of Cor-
rections, Chapter 13 of Title 64. 
Peace officer training, Chapter 15 of Title 67. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
(1) "Correctional officer" means an officer or employee of the Department of 
Corrections or youth corrections or any political subdivision of the state which 
is charged with the primary duty of providing community protection. Specific 
assignments include controlling, transporting, supervising, and taking into 
custody of persons arrested or convicted of crimes, supervising and preventing 
the escape of persons in state and local incarceration facilities, providing 
supervision of parolees and probationers, and providing investigative services 
for offenders being considered for probation or parole. 
(2) Correctional officers have peace officer authority only while engaged in 
the performance of their duties. They do not have peace officer status while off 
duty except when engaged in the activities in Subsection (2)(a). Correctional 
officers may carry firearms only if authorized by and under conditions speci-
fied by the director of the Department of Corrections or the chief law enforce-
ment officer of the employing agency. 
(3) (a) No correctional officer or parole and probation agent may exercise 
the authority of a peace officer until the officer has satisfactorily com-
pleted a basic training program for correctional officers and the director 
of the Department of Corrections or the chief administrator of the employ-
ing agency has certified the completion of training to the director of Peace 
Officer Standards and Training. 
(b) The Department of Corrections of the state or the employing 
agency, shall establish and maintain a corrections officer basic course and 
in-service training programs as approved by the director of Peace Officer 
Standards and Training, with the advice and consent of the Council on 
Peace Officer Standards and Training. The training shall consist of no 
fewer than 40 hours per year, and shall be conducted by the agency's own 
staff or other agencies. 
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— Delays by defendant 
Delays caused by the defendant will not be 
counted against the State and will weigh 
against the defendant in considering whether, 
under the circumstances, the trial was unnec-
essarily delayed. State v. Trafny, 799 P.2d 704 
(Utah 1990). 
—Federal custody. 
Time a defendant spends in custody of fed-
eral authorities cannot be counted against the 
state for speedy trial purposes. State v. Trafny, 
799 P.2d 704 (Utah 1990). 
—Thirty-day requirement. 
Subsection (l)(h) is directory in nature, not 
mandatory. State v. Hoyt, 153 Utah Adv. Rep. 
16 (Ct. App. 1991). 
Defendant, who failed to 
if rCiAtb urnv^on uc-oiuMnnun 
pr«*mlW^ 
ment that he was actually prejudiiJiil^W 
lay of 124 days between a n t * t ^ H i ? * ^4 
not denied his constitutional riol!*!: ^ ^ ' » constitutional right fa
 k 
trial. State v. Hoyt, 153 Utah Adv \Z~ 
App. 1991). j fig!) 
Transcript*, ^ f i ^ f 
—Legibility. t t i ^ -
«-**•«» C 1953. 77-1-7, enacted by L. 
T^j?7t ft 2. 
^ SSBJ^» Notes. — This section recodifies 
^ ' ^ o c t i o n 77-35-25(d), which is Rule 
''IrfjbelJtah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
For notes from cases construing that rule, see 
the Court Rules volume. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1990, ch. 7, § 12 
makes the act effective on July 1, 1990. 
• $ * 
SP 
lble)' 
The condition of transcripts, in * i l ^ % i ' s .^jj£j4.. 
le)" appeared solely in conneetioit«kkV.A'^-.t,^:^'j> 
CHAPTER la 
PEACE OFFICER DESIGNATION 
•etWMrtMk'ifo.- m Special function officers. 
Author-
A.L.R. — Crimes against spouse within ex-
ception permitting testimony by one spouse 
against other in criminal prosecution—modern 
state cases, 74 A.L.R.4th 223. 
Competency of one spouse to testify against 
other in prosecution for offense against third 
party as affected by fact that offenae against 
spouse was involved in same transaction, 74 
A.L.R.4th 277. 
77-1 
the defendant of due process or of S7P' l *&4S S p C , f u n c t l 0 f l °n,c< 
appeal, because the transcripts w e S ^ ^ •$* F e d e r a l ^ ^ ° f f iCerS 
complete and amply adequate for • rtvi^^ ! ^$fc ^ 
the defendant's claims. State v. Jnnt>> fiflf ^-;'"'-%^ ^  
902 (Utah ct App 1990). ^^#Ci l^4 . Special function officers. 
^0%:^Special function officers" means persons performing specialized inves-
^ $ ^ ^Safionfl, service oflegal process, or security functions. These officers include 
*$$:$$' »SJmilitary police, constables, port of entry officers, school district security 
' ' I fioOT, Utah State Hospital security officers designated pursuant to Section 
3' &&£203, Utah State Training School security officers designated pursuant 
• gSabsection 62A-5-206O), fire arson investigators for any political subdivi-
fafofthe state, airport security officers of any airport owned or operated by 
> imitate or any of its political subdivisions, railroad special agents deputized 
Adverse presumption or inference ^ & i # & m n t y sheriff under Section 17-30-2, and all other persons designated by 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES »:U*$$W 
Standing of media representative* flfffrp^ 
zations to seek review of, or to inWrvtar^ 
oppose, order closing criminal prooMtbof& Ji 
public, 74 A.L.R.4th 476. VH t* 
failure to produce or examine codeftttfefri v 
accomplice who m not on trial — motUrt ttl^* 
nal cases, 76 A.L.R.4th 812. . iw^^V 
j | tate i 
,14?unl „ 
i&ftte as having peace officer authority. 
(a) Special function officers have peace officer authority only while en-
^ J | §gaged in the duties of their respective employment, and not for the pur-
^ ^ > > ? | 3|po8e of general law enforcement. If the officer is charged with security 
Jl; i>| i^functions respecting facilities or property, the powers may be exercised ',*>*?« 
where the officer is 
employer's interest, 
7 r%z~—~z i 'xi A . • i ~. . . . . !'»^*--:>/i31'cifRiunctions respecting lawnuca ui piupci t j , w*^  [ / w"w u 
• Dismissal Without trial — Custody or discharge f# &
 i n c o n n e c t i o n with acts occurring on the property < 
d e f e n d a n t . ^ ; | ^ ^employed or when required for the protection of the e 
(1) (a) Further prosecution for an offense is not barred if the court ^ ^ ¥ ^ ^ ^ l Z ^ ^ ^ 
an information or indictment based on the ground: ' ' *™ 
(i) there was unreasonable delay; 
(ii) the court is without jurisdiction; 
(iii) the offense was not properly alleged in the informatkii L 
(iv) there was a defect in the impaneling or the proceedings;*1^| ^  ^ ^ ^ . ^
 rf £ r e a r m s £ y c o n s t a b l e s is authorized only while they 
; * > « * * 
vft'%-W ^ Airport security officers have total peace officer authority when on 
S.«&:^duty and when acting in relation to the responsibilities of the airport a t 
ing to the grand jury. ®&: (b) The court may make orders regarding custody of the d ^ } ^ « ? ^ ^ 
O t ^ i ^ / f ° ^ ^ f ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ' t ^ ' P ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ "*> satisfactorily completed an approved basic Otherwise, the defendant shall be discharged and bail exonerated;>•$ 1;™*?.m™ln_ " _ ! :„, A , . ^ ^ ^AW™ « nrnvided under Subsec-. , tn  t ll  i   il x m r t ^ ^ l ^ ^ r ^ — — ^ ^ ^
 f u n c t i o n 0ff i c e rs as provided under ubsec-
i order of dismissal based upon unconstitutional delay in b r i i i g i i < ^ ? » 2 ! S ^ l 5 r ^ ^ ^ S i : w enforcement officer or administrator has (2) An defendant 
prosecution for the offense charged, 
92 
j % certified U**o »«wv
 w w. 
'$. ^ and Training. City and county constables and their deputies shall certity 
^ : the i r completion of training to the legislative governing body of the 
| f county they serve. , 
-3* (b) The agency that the special function officer serves shall establish 
$ and maintain a basic special function course and in-service training pro-
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1-12-9. Allocation and distribution of funds. 
The commission, in accordance with its policy, shall allocate $6,500,000 for 
e construction of a fine arts center located at Salt Lake City, Utah and shall 
stribute $1,500,000 outside Salt Lake City, in its discretion and under such 
nditions as it prescribes to groups and local governments within the state to 
sist them with their plans and development for commemoration of the 200th 
rthday of the United States. The interest income may be used on projects 
proved by the Commission both within and outside Salt Lake County. Fi-
incial participation by private, local or federal government sources or some 
mbination thereof at a ratio determined by the commission shall be re-
ired for all projects which receive state-appropriated funds. 
iistory: L. 1974, cfa. 40, § 2; 1975, ch. 192, 
1-12-10. Contribution to construction and operation of 
fine arts center. 
The state of Utah shall have title to an undivided interest in the fine arts 
iter proportionate to its contribution. The state of Utah shall contribute 
,500,000 to the construction, operation and maintenance of the fine arts 
iter and the commission may also use at its discretion the interest or any 
rt of it, earned on the $6,500,000 for purposes of the construction, operation 
d maintenance of the center. If the commission is unable to commit the 
itching funds required by this act for construction of the fine arts center by 
nuary 1, 1976, the $6,500,000 allocated herein for the fine arts center, 
elusive of the interest theron, shall not be committed until further act of the 
gislature excepting $500,000 which shall be allocated by the Bicentennial 
mmission for the Bicentennial Ogden Union Station project. 
Iistory: L. 1974, ch. 40, 9 3; 1975, ch. 192, 
CHAPTER 13 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS — 
STATE PRISON 
unset Act. — Section 63-55-7 provides that all divisions, councils, offices, section*, and other 
ities of the Department of Corrections are repealed effective July 1, 1993. 
Lion Section 
L3-1. Definitions. 64-13-6. Purpose of department. 
L3-2. Creation of department. 64-13-7. Offenders in custody of department. 
L3-3 Executive director. 64-13-8 Department staff. 
[3-4. Repealed. 64-13-9. Department services to other agen-
L3-4 1. Creation of Corrections Advisory cies. 
Council. 64-13-10. Department duties. 
3-5. Council duties 64-13-11. Evaluation programs. 
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Section 
64-13-12. Jail facilities and cost*. 
64-13-13. Deputy directors. 
64-13-14. Prison facilities. 
64-13-15. Inmate property. 
64-13-16 Inmate employment. 
64-13-17. Visitors to prison facilities. 
64-13-18. Sentence of incarceration. 
64-13-19. Prison labor. 
64-13-20. Investigative services. 
64-13-21. Community protection. 
64-13-22. Community-based programs. 
64-13-23. Compensation for inmate employ-
ment. 
Section 
64-13-24. Standards for staff. 
64-13-25. Standards for programs. 
64-13-26. Private providers of services. 
64-13-27. Records. 
64-13-28. Hearings. 
64-13-29. Violation of parole or probation. 
64-13-30. Expenses of offenders. 
64-13-31. Emergencies. 
64-13-32. Discipline of offenders. 
64-13-33. Restitution for offenses. 
64-13-34. Safety of offenders 
64-13-35. Alcohol and drugs. 
64-13-1. Definitions-
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Department" means the Department of Corrections. 
(2) "Executive director" means the executive director of the Depart-
ment of Corrections. 
(3) "Council" means the Corrections Advisory Council. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-1, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 198, § 1. 
Repeals and Enactments. — Laws 1985, 
ch. 198, § 1 repeals former § 64-13-1, as 
enacted by Laws 1977, ch. 253, § 1, relating to 
definitions of ,rboard," "division," and "direc-
tor," and enacts the above section. 
Cross-References. — Criminal identifica-
tion, Chapter 26 of Title 77 
Delivery of prisoners to prison, sheriffs du-
ties, §§ 17-22-3, 64-13-24. 
Establishment and support of institution, 
Utah Const., Art. XIX, Sec. 2. 
Land grants, Enabling Act, Sec. 12; Utah 
Const., Art. XX, Sec. 1. 
Location of institution, Utah Const., Art. 
XIX, Sec. 3. 
Offenses punishable by confinement in state 
prison, § 76-3-208. 
Place of execution of death penalty, 
§ 77-19-10. 
State prison commissioners, Utah Const., 
Art. VTI, Sec. 13. 
Western Interstate Corrections Compact, 
Chapter 28 of Title 77. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Validity of classification procedures. 
Procedures for classification and reclassifica-
tion of inmates within the minimum, medium, 
and maximum security areas of the state 
prison, adopted by the Board of Corrections 
pursuant to former § 64-9-25, were not arbi-
trary and did not depnve inmates of due pro-
cess rights. Lavine v. Wright, 423 F. Supp. 357 
(D. Utah 1976). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 60 Am. Jur. 2d Penal and 
Correctional Institutions §§ 1 to 3. 
C.J.S. — 72 CJS. Prisons § 2. 
Key Numbers, — Prisons •» i. 
64-13-2. Creation of department. 
There is created a Department of Corrections, under the general supervi-
sion of the executive director of the department. The department is the state 
authority for corrections and assumes all powers and responsibilities formerly 
vested in the Board of Corrections and the Division of Corrections in the 
Department of Social Services. 
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1) The director of the department shall provide staff assistance and any 
irmation necessary for the Corrections Advisory Council to fulfill its re-
nsibilities under this chapter. 
istory: C. 1963, 64-13-5, enacted by L. enacted by Laws 1977, ch. 253, § 5, creating 
>, ch. 198, I 5. division of corrections, and enacts the above 
epeals and Enactments. — Laws 1985, section. 
198, § 5 repeals former § 64-13-5, as 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
J .S . — 72 C.J.S. Prisons § 5. 
ey Numbers. — Prisons *» 4. 
•13-6. Purpose of department. 
Tie primary purpose of the Department of Corrections includes the follow-
(1) protection of the public through institutional care and confinement, 
and supervision in the community where appropriate; 
(2) implementation of court-ordered punishment of the criminal of-
fender for the purpose of maintaining a law-abiding and productive soci-
ety; 
(3) provision of rehabilitation opportunities to assist the criminal of-
fender m functioning as a law-abiding and productive member of society; 
(4) individualized treatment of the offender; and 
(5) management of programs to take into account the needs and inter-
ests of victims where reasonable. 
[istory: C. 1953, 64-13-6, enacted by L. ch. 211, § 1 repeals former § 64-13-6 as 
5, ch. 211, § 1. amended by Laws 1979, ch. 102, § 16, relating 
Repeals and Enactments. — Laws 1985, to appointment of director, and enacts the 
198, § 9 repeals § 64-13-6, and Laws 1985, above Hectwn. 
-13-7. Offenders in custody of department. 
\1I offenders committed for incarceration in a state prison facility, for su-
rvision on probation or parole, or for evaluation, shall be placed in the 
-tody of the department. The department shall establish procedures and is 
jponsible for the appropriate assignment or transfer of public offenders to 
ilities or programs. 
listory: C. 1953, 64-13-7, enacted by L. administration of state prison, and enacts the 
15, ch. 211, § 2. above section. 
lepeals and Enactments. — Laws 1985, Cross-References. — Pardons and paroles, 
211, § 2 repeals former § 64-13-7, as Chapter 27 of Title 77. 
icted by Laws 1977, ch. 253, § 7, relating to 
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64-13-8. Department stan. 
The department shall employ staff necessary to operate prison facilities, 
probation programs, parole programs, and other facilities and programs as 
necessary for the management of the offender. The department shall desig-
nate by policy which of those employees have the powers of peace officers, the 
power to administer oaths, and other powers the department deems appropri-
ate, including but not limited to the responsibility to bear firearms. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-8, enacted by L. appointment of warden, and enacts the above 
1985, ch. 211, § 3. section. 
Repeals and Enactments. — Laws 1985, Cross-References. — Constitutional oath, 
ch. 211, § 3 repeals former § 64-13-8, as Utah Const., Art. IV, Sec. 10. 
enacted by Laws 1977, ch. 253, § 8, relating to Official oaths and bonds, § 52-1-1 et seq. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 72 CJ.S. Prisons § 19. 
Key Numbers. — Prisons «=» 13. 
64-13-9. Department services to other agencies. 
Within the various judicial districts, the department shall, as provided by 
lav , provide investigation services to assist the court in sentencing decisions, 
to assist the Board of Pardons in release decisions, and to assist in the internal 
management of the department. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-9, enacted by L. warden's quarters, and enacts the above sec-
1985, ch. 211, § 4. tion. 
Repeals and Enactments. — Laws 1985, Cross-References. — Pardons and paroles, 
ch. 211, § 5 repeals former § 64-13-9, as Chapter 27 of Title 77. 
enacted by Laws 1977, ch. 253, § 9, relating to 
64-13-10. Department duties. 
The department shall provide probation supervision programs, parole su-
pervision programs, prison facilities, community correctional centers, and 
other programs or facilities as required for the safe management of public 
offenders. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-10, enacted by L. to powers and duties of warden, and enacts the 
1985, ch. 211, § 5. above section. 
Repeals and Enactments. — Laws 1985, Cross-References. — Pardons and paroles, 
ch. 211, § 5 repeals former § 64-13-10, as Chapter 27 of Title 77. 
enacted by Laws 1977, ch. 253, § 10, relating 
64-13-11. Evaluation programs. 
The department shall operate evaluation programs necessary to serve pub-
lic offenders committed to it for short-term evaluation by the district courts. 
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iat was needed for state institutions, was not spect to establishment of a garment factory 
:ontract for sale of goods, but rather was con- within walls of prison, held, not to contravene 
jet for prison labor, and hence was void un- former statute. Pollock v. Mabey, 63 Utah 377, 
r former statute. Price v Mabey, 62 Utah 226 P 186 (1924). 
6, 218 P. 724 (1923). 
itablishment of garment factory. 
Resolution of board of corrections with re-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 60 Am. Jur. 2d Penal and Key Numbers. — Convicts •» 7-10, 13; 
rrectional Institutions §§ 34 to 40 Prisons *» 13. 
C.J.S. — 18 C J.S. Convicts §§ 13 to 26; 72 
J.S. Prisons § 18. 
H3-20. Investigative services. 
The department shall provide investigative functions and prepare reports to 
sist the courts in sentencing functions, and the Board of Pardons in its 
cision-making responsibilities regarding offenders, the department in man-
ing the offender, and to assure the professional and accountable manage-
snt of the department. 
(1) The department shall establish standards for the provision of inves-
tigative services based on available resources, giving priority to felony 
cases. 
(2) The department shall employ staff for the purpose of thoroughly 
investigating the social, physical, and mental conditions and background 
of offenders and shall conduct examinations when required by the court 
or Board of Pardons, subject to the limitations of Subsection 64-13-15(1). 
The department may also provide recommendations concerning appropri-
ate measures to be taken on behalf of offenders. If the court desires addi-
tional information it may commit the offender to the custody of the de-
partment for further evaluation as provided in § 76-3-404. 
(3) The investigative reports prepared by the department are confiden-
tial and are not available for public inspection except upon court order, or 
as provided in Subsection (4). 
(4) Presentence reports shall be made available, upon request, to the 
defendant, his attorney, the state's attorney, and other correctional pro-
grams within the state if the offender who is the subject of the report has 
been committed or is being evaluated for commitment to the facility for 
treatment as a condition of probation or parole. The presentence reports 
shall include a victim impact statement in all felony cases and in misde-
meanor cases where the defendant caused bodily harm or death to the 
victim. Victim impact statements shall: 
(a) identify the victim of the offense; 
(b) itemize any economic loss suffered by the victim as a result of 
the offense; 
(c) identify any physical, mental, or emotional injuries suffered by 
the victim as a result of the offense, along with the seriousness and 
permanence; 
(d) describe any change in the victim's personal welfare or familial 
relationships as a result of the offense; 
(e) identify any request for mental health services initiated by the 
victim or the victim's family as a result of the offense; and 
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(f) contain any other information related to the impact of the of-
fense upon the victim or the victim's family that the court requires. If 
the victim is deceased, under a mental, physical, or legal disability, 
or otherwise unable to provide the information required under this 
section, the information may be obtained from the personal represen-
tative, guardian, or family members, as necessary. 
(5) The department shall employ staff necessary to pursue investiga-
tions of complaints from the public, staff, or offenders regarding the man-
agement of corrections programs. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-20, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Access to state 
1985, ch. 211, § 15. records, §§ 63-2-66, 63-2-67. 
Repeals and Enactments. — Laws 1985, Pardon and parole, Chapter 27 of Title 77. 
ch. 211 § 15 repeals fonner § 64-13-20 as Restitution to crime victim, §§ 76-3-201 to 
enacted by Laws 1977, ch. 253, § 20, relating 76.3.201 2 
to visitors to prison, and enacts the above sec-
tion. 
64-13-21. Community protection. 
For the purpose of maintaining community protection from offenders placed 
on probation or conditionally released on parole, the department, except as 
otherwise provided by law, shall supervise offenders in the community, in-
cluding coordination of programs where appropriate, and restitution where 
possible, and the provision of public service restitution work opportunities. 
Standards for the supervision of offenders shall be established by the depart-
ment, giving priority to felony offenders based on available resources. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-21, enacted by L. to reports by warden, and enacts the above sec-
1985, ch. 211, § 16. tion. 
Repeals and Enactments. — Laws 1985, Cross-References. — Restitution to crime 
ch. 211, § 16 repeals former § 64-13-21, as victim, §§ 76-3-201 to 76-3-201.2. 
enacted by Laws 1977, ch. 253, § 21, relating 
64-13-22. Community-based programs. 
(1) The department shall provide residential and nonresidential commu-
nity-based programs, care, treatment, and supervision of offenders. The de-
partment shall place offenders committed to it for nonsecure supervision and 
treatment in the most appropriate program, based upon the department's 
evaluation and the available resources. 
(2) The department shall establish and maintain facilities known as com-
munity correctional centers for work and day release programs for offenders. 
(3) The department may allow an offender to leave a minimum security 
facility, a community corrections center, or a community-based program dur-
ing reasonable hours, for the purpose of assisting the offender in reintegration 
into the community as a law-abiding and productive member of society. The 
purpose includes, but is not limited to, employment, treatment, education 
programs, and maintenance of family ties. 
(4) The department shall establish rules governing release status for of-
fenders. A copy of the rules shall be furnished to the offender and to any 
employer or other person participating in the offender's release program. Any 
employer or other participating person shall agree in writing to abide by the 
119 
64-13-17 STATE INSTITUTIONS 
History: C. 1053, 64-13-16, enacted by L. ployed on a regular basis, aa is practicable" at 
1985, ch. 211, &U; 1987, ch. 116, § 11. the end of the first sentence, substituted "An 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- offender may not" for "No inmate may" at the 
ment substituted "the department may employ beginning of the second sentence, and deleted 
inmates to the degree that funding and avail- the former third, fourth, and last sentences, 
able resources allow" for "inmates shall be era-
64-13-17. Visitors to correctional facilities — Correspon-
dence. 
(1) (a) The following persons may visit correctional facilities without the 
consent of the department: the governor; attorney general; judges of the 
circuit, district, and appellate courts; members of the Corrections Advi-
sory Council; members of the Board of Pardons; members of the Legisla-
ture; and any other persons authorized under rules prescribed by the 
department or court order. 
(b) Any person acting under a court order may visit or correspond with 
any inmate without the consent of the department. 
(c) The department may limit access to correctional facilities when the 
department or governor declares an emergency or when there is a riot or 
other disturbance. 
(2) A person may not visit with any offender at any correctional facility, 
other than under Subsection (1), without the consent of the department. Of-
fenders and all visitors may be required to submit to a search or inspection of 
their persons and properties as a condition of visitation. 
(3) Offenders housed at any correctional facility may send and receive cor-
respondence, subject to the rules of the department. All correspondence is 
subject to search, consistent with department rules. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-17, enacted by L. "inmate", and "under" for "those provided for 
1985, ch. 211, 3 12; 1987, ch. 116, 5 12. in" in the first sentence, substituted "Of-
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- fenders" for "Inmates" and deleted "exercising" 
ment divided Subsection (1) into present Sub- preceding "visitation" in the second sentence, 
sections (l)(a) and (1Kb) and added present ^ d deleted the former third sentence as set 
Subsection UXc); in Subsection (l)(a), substi-
 o u t i n t h e bmuKi volume; and, in Subsection 
tuted "correctional" for "state pnson" near the
 ( 3 ) substituted "Offenders housed at any cor-
bepnmng of the subsection; m Subsection (2), ^ ^
 f a c l l i t yn for «Inmi l te8» m the first 
substituted A person may not for No person sentence 
may", "offender at any correctional facility" for 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Validity and construction of prison 
regulation of inmates' possession of personal 
property, 66 A.L.R.4th 800. 
64-13-19. Labor at correctional facilities. 
The department shall determine the types of labor to be pursued, and what 
kind, quality, and quantity of goods, materials, and supplies shall be pro-
duced, manufactured, or repaired at correctional facilities. Contracts may be 
made for the labor of offenders, including contracts with any federal agency 
for a project affecting national defense. As many offenders as practicable may 
be employed to produce, manufacture, or repair any goods, materials, or sup-
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plies for sale to the state or its political subdivisions. Prices for all goods, 
materials, and supplies shall be fixed by the department. 
History: C. 1963, 64-13-19, enacted by L. "the prisons'* at the end of the first sentence 
1986, ch. 211, § 14; 1987, ch. 116, § 13. and "offenders" for "inmates'* in the second and 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- third sentences, and inserted "sale to" in the 
ment substituted "correctional facilities" for third sentence. 
64-13-20. Investigative services — Presentence investiga-
tions and diagnostic evaluations. 
(1) The department shall: 
(a) provide investigative and diagnostic services and prepare reports 
to: 
(i) assist the courts in sentencing; 
(ii) assist the Board of Pardons in its decision-making responsibili-
ties regarding offenders; 
(iii) assist the department in managing offenders; and 
(iv) assure the professional and accountable management of the 
department; 
(b) establish standards for providing investigative and diagnostic ser-
vices based on available resources, giving priority to felony cases; 
(c) employ staff for the purpose of conducting: 
(i) thorough presentence investigations of the social, physical, and 
mental conditions and backgrounds of offenders; 
(ii) examinations when required by the court or Board of Pardons; 
and 
(iii) thorough diagnostic evaluations of offenders as the court finds 
necessary to supplement the presentence investigation report under 
Section 76-3-404. 
(2) The department may provide recommendations concerning appropriate 
measures to be taken regarding offenders. 
(3) (a) The presentence diagnostic evaluation and investigation reports pre-
pared by the department are confidential as defined in Section 77-18-1 
and after sentencing may not be released except by express court order or 
by rules made by the Department of Corrections. 
(b) The reports are intended only for use by: 
(i) the court in the sentencing process; 
(ii) the Board of Pardons in its decision-making responsibilities; 
and 
(iii) the department in the supervision, confinement, and treat-
ment of the offender. 
(4) Presentence diagnostic evaluation and investigation reports shall be 
made available upon request to other correctional programs within the state ii 
the offender who is the subject of the report has been committed or is being 
evaluated for commitment to the facility for treatment as a condition of proba-
tion or parole. 
(5) (a) The presentence investigation reports shall include a victim impad 
statement in all felony cases and in misdemeanor cases if the defendani 
caused bodily harm or death to the victim. 
(b) Victim impact statements shall: 
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(i) identify the victim of the offense; 
(ii) itemize any economic loss suffered by the victim as a result of 
the offense; 
(iii) identify any physical, mental, or emotional injuries suffered 
by the victim as a result of the offense, and the seriousness and 
permanence; 
(iv) describe any change in the victim's personal welfare or famil-
ial relationships as a result of the offense; 
(v) identify any request for mental health services initiated by the 
victim or the victim's family as a result of the offense; and 
(vi) contain any other information related to the impact of the 
offense upon the victim or the victim's family that the court requires. 
(6) If the victim is deceased; under a mental, physical, or legal disability; or 
otherwise unable to provide the information required under this section, the 
information may be obtained from the personal representative, guardian, or 
family members, as necessary. 
(7) The department shall employ staff necessary to pursue investigations of 
complaints from the public, staff, or offenders regarding the management of 
corrections programs. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-20, enacted by L. Subsection (lXc); deleted "the defendant, his 
1985, ch. 211, § 15; 1987, ch. 116, § 14; 1991, attorney, the state's attorney, and" preceding 
ch. 206, § 4. "other correctional programs'* in Subsection 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- (i)(d); redesignated Subsections (4)(a) through 
ment redesignated Subsections (1) through (3) (4)(f) as present Subsections (l)(e)(i) through 
as present Subsections (IXa) through UKc), (i)(e)(vi); substituted Hand" for "along with" in 
Subsection (4) as present Subsections (l)(d) Subsection (lXeXih) 
through (1X0, and Subsection (5) as present
 T h e 1 9 9 1 a m e n d ment , effective April 29, 
Subsection (2), respectively; designated the for-
 1 9 9 1 rewn)te S u D 8 e c t l o n {1) ^ Subsections (1) 
mer introductory language as ^ e introductory ^
 h 6 ) a d d o r c h t h e s u b s e c t l o n 
anguage of present Subsection ( 1 ; substituted
 a e 8 1 ^ a t l o n 8 > a d d Subsections (lXcXm) and 
investigative services for investigative func- ,0>,,° ' J* . MJ. , 
turns," -to assist" for "functions, and" preced- ( 3 ) ( b ; inserting references to diagnostic ser-
ing "the Board of Pardons" and "offenders" for " f a i n Subsections (IXa) and (1Kb), inserting 
"the offender" and inserted "to assist" preced- references to presentence diagnostic evaiua-
mg "the department" m the introductory Ian- *™ and investigation reports in Subsections 
guage of Subsection (1); deleted "subject to the <3>(a> a n d <4>» substituting the language begm-
hmitations of Subsection 64-13-15 (1)" from ™n& with "as defined" m Subsection (3Xa) for 
the end of the first sentence of Subsection "under Chapter 2, Title 63t regarding informa-
(lXb); substituted "regarding" for "on behalf tion practices," and making several stylistic 
of in the second sentence of Subsection (l)(b); changes throughout Subsections (1) through 
deleted the former third sentence of Subsection (6), and redesignated Subsection (2) as Subsec-
(l)(b) as set out in the bound volume; rewrote tion (7). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in State v. Thurston, 781 P 2d 1296 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
64-13-21. Supervision of sentenced offenders placed in 
community. 
The department, except as otherwise provided by law, shall supervise sen-
tenced offenders placed in the community on probation by the courts, on pa-
role by the Board of Pardons, or upon acceptance for supervision under the 
terms of the Interstate Compact for the Supervision of Parolees and Proba-
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tioners. Standards for the supervision of offenders shall be established by the 
department, giving priority, based on available resources, to felony offenders. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-21, enacted by L. ment rewrote the first sentence and made a 
1985, ch. 211, $ 16; 1987, ch. 116, & 15. minor phraseology change in the second sen-
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- tence. 
64-13-22. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1987, ch. 116, § 28 repeals § 17, relating to community-based programs, 
I 64-13-22, as enacted by Laws 1985, ch. 211, effective April 27, 1987. 
64-13-23. Offenders' income and finances. 
The department may require each offender, while in the custody of the 
department or while on probation or parole, to place funds received or earned 
by him from any source into an account administered by the department or 
into a joint account with the department at a federally insured financial 
institution. 
(1) The department may require each offender to maintain a minimum 
balance in either or both accour*s for the particular offender's use upon 
discharge from the custody of the department or upon completion of pa-
role or probation. 
(2) If placed in a joint account at a federally insured financial institu-tion: 
(a) any interest accrues to the benefit of the offender account; and 
(b) the department may require that the signatures of both the 
offender and a departmental representative be submitted to the fi-
nancial institution to withdraw funds from the account. 
(3) If placed in an account administered by the department, the depart-
ment may by rule designate a certain portion of the offender's funds as 
interest-bearing savings, and another portion as noninterest-bearing to 
be used for day-to-day expenses. 
(4) The department may withhold part of the offender's funds in either 
account for expenses of incarceration, supervision, or treatment; for court-
ordered restitution, reparation, fines, alimony, support payments, or simi-
lar court-ordered payments; for department-ordered restitution; and for 
any other debt to the state. 
(5) The department may disclose information on offender accounts to 
the Office of Recovery Services and other appropriate state agencies. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-23, enacted by L. in the custody of the department or while on 
1987, ch. 116, § 16; 1991, ch. 125, § 1. probation or parole" and substituted "funds re-
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1987, ceived or earned by him from any source" for 
ch. 116, § 16 repeals former § 64-13-23, as en- f,hi8 income from employment while in the cus-
acted by Laws 1985, ch. 211, § 18, relating to t ^ y
 0f the department or while on probation or 
compensation for inmate employment, and parole" in the introductory paragraph and de-
enacts the present action , e t e d « in lta diacretion" after "department 
^ e n d m e n t Notes, - - T h e 199]I amend- „
 i n S u b 8 e c t l o n ( 5 ) . 
ment, effective April 29, 1991, inserted while 
23 
64-13-17 STATE INSTITUTIONS | 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-16, enacted by L. ployed on a regular basis, as is practicable" at 3 
1985, ch. 211, ft 11; 1987, ch. 116, § 11. the end of the first sentence, substituted "An J 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- offender may not" for "No inmate may" at the J 
ment substituted "the department may employ beginning of the second sentence, and deleted \ 
inmates to the degree that funding and avail- the former third, fourth, and last sentences * 
able resources allow" for "inmates shall be em- ' 
64-13-17. Visitors to correctional facilities — Correspon-
dence. 
(1) (a) The following persons may visit correctional facilities without the 
consent of the department: the governor; attorney general; judges of the 
circuit, district, and appellate courts; members of the Corrections Advi-
sory Council; members of the Board of Pardons; members of the Legisla-
ture; and any other persons authorized under rules prescribed by the 
department or court order. 
(b) Any person acting under a court order may visit or correspond with 
any inmate without the consent of the department. 
(c) The department may limit access to correctional facilities when the 
department or governor declares an emergency or when there is a riot or 
other disturbance. 
(2) A person may not visit with any offender at any correctional facility, 
other than under Subsection (1), without the consent of the department. Of-
fenders and all visitors may be required to submit to a search or inspection of 
their persons and properties as a condition of visitation. 
(3) Offenders housed at any correctional facility may send and receive cor-
respondence, subject to the rules of the department. All correspondence is 
subject to search, consistent with department rules. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-17, enacted by L. "inmate", and "under" for "those provided for 
1985, ch. 211, 5 12; 1987, ch. 116, § 12. in" in the first sentence, substituted "Of-
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- fenders" for "Inmates" and deleted "exercising" 
ment divided Subsection (1) into present Sub- preceding "visitation" in the second sentence, 
sections (l)(a) and (1Kb) and added present
 a n d deleted the former third sentence as set 
Subsection (l)(c); in Subsection (l)(a), substi-
 o u t m t h e fo^ volume; and, in Subsection 
tuted "correctional" for "state prison" near the
 ( 3 ) sub8tituted "Offenders housed at any cor-
beginmng of the subsection; in Subsection (2), ^ ^
 f a c l h t y » f o r « I n m a t e 8 » m the first 
substituted A person may not for No person gentence 
may", "offender at any correctional facility" for 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Validity and construction of prison 
regulation of inmates' possession of personal 
property, 66 A.L.R.4th 800. 
64-13*19. Labor at correctional facilities. 
The department shall determine the types of labor to be pursued, and what 
kind, quality, and quantity of goods, materials, and supplies shall be pro-
duced, manufactured, or repaired at correctional facilities. Contracts may be 
made for the labor of offenders, including contracts with any federal agency 
for a project affecting national defense. As many offenders as practicable may 
be employed to produce, manufacture, or repair any goods, materials, or sup-
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*;i plies for sale to the state or its political subdivisions. Prices for all goods, 
{^materials, and supplies shall be fixed by the department. 
J.^k History: C. 1953, 64-13-19, enacted by L. "the prisons" at the end of the first sentence 
l£985, ch. 211, ft 14; 1987, ch. 116, ft 13. and "offenders" for "inmates" in the second and 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- third sentences, and inserted "sale to" in the 
( ment substituted "correctional facilities" for third sentence. 
:;64-13-20. Investigative services — Presentence investiga-
*.. tions and diagnostic evaluations. 
/
 v ( l ) The department shall: 
' tt> (a) provide investigative and diagnostic services and prepare reports 
Xv to: 
i,j (i) assist the courts in sentencing; 
* (ii) assist the Board of Pardons in its decision-making responsibili-
rnc ties regarding offenders; 
|SQ (iii) assist the department in managing offenders; and 
j ! , (iv) assure the professional and accountable management of the 
* > department; 
' *,*'' (b) establish standai i s for providing investigative and diagnostic ser-
\V* vices based on available resources, giving priority to felony cases; 
'^' (c) employ staff for the purpose of conducting: 
,
 n. (i) thorough presentence investigations of the social, physical, and 
iu mental conditions and backgrounds of offenders; 





 (iii) thorough diagnostic evaluations of offenders as the court finds 
j,', necessary to supplement the presentence investigation report under 
.., " Section 76-3-404. 
. l< (2) The department may provide recommendations concerning appropriate 
v measures to be taken regarding offenders. 
' * (3) (a) The presentence diagnostic evaluation and investigation reports pre-
1(
%
 pared by the department are confidential as defined in Section 77-18-1 
.*.-, and after sentencing may not be released except by express court order or 
ji by rules made by the Department of Corrections. 
* (b) The reports are intended only for use by: 
° (i) the court in the sentencing process; 
(ii) the Board of Pardons in its decision-making responsibilities; 
and 
(iii) the department in the supervision, confinement, and treat-
i ment of the offender. 
i 3
 (4) Presentence diagnostic evaluation and investigation reports shall be 
r made available upon request to other correctional programs within the state if 
t the offender who is the subject of the report has been committed or is being 
^evaluated for commitment to the facility for treatment as a condition of proba-
1
 tion or parole. 
(5) (a) The presentence investigation reports shall include a victim impact 
<„ statement in all felony cases and in misdemeanor cases if the defendant 
v caused bodily harm or death to the victim, 





REBECCA C. HYDE, #6409 PILED DISTRICT COURT 
.„ , ^
 r . ' THitr! • j : - ia! District 
Attorney for Defendant »h" 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
 1QQ7 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 NOV 1 3 ' " ' 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
 SALT uu£|ggp*J^ 
Telephone: (801) 532-5444 ^ Ir^-^S^S^, 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH, 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION I 





FINDINGS OF FACT 
Case No. 921901600FS 
JUDGE WILLIAM A. THORNE 
On October 17,1997, an Evidentiary Hearing was held in the above-entitled 
matter pursuant to Rule 23B, Utah R. App. Pro. for the purpose of entering Findings of 
Fact relevant to Appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Both parties were 
present. Pursuant to Rule 23B(e), Utah R. App Pro. and based upon the evidence 
presented by Appellant, this Court enters the following Findings of Fact: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Defendant, Tony Maestas, was represented at trial by 
Mr. Victor Gordon. 
2. The Court has reviewed records contained in Tony Waldron's prison 
file maintained by the Utah Department of Corrections. 
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3. Defense counsel gained access to said records pursuant to the 
Government Records Access and Management Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-101 et. sec. 
(1993). 
4. The Court has reviewed records maintained by the Investigations 
Bureau of the Utah Department of Corrections relating to the arrest and conviction of 
Tony Maestas, and the use of Tony Waldron as a confidential informant. 
5. Defense counsel gained access to said records pursuant to the 
Government Records Access and Management Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-101 et. sec. 
(1993). 
6. The aforementioned records contain the following information: 
7. Tony Waldron (Waldron) was committed to the prison on November 
5, 1990, on a conviction of two counts of Forgery, second degree felonies. 
8. Waldron's expected release date from prison was January 14,1993. 
9. As late as February 7, 1992, Waldron's expected release date 
remained unchanged. 
10. On August 15, 1991, Waldron was assigned to work at the prison 
dairy. 
11. On November 26, 1991, Waldron was one of three inmates 
suspected of smuggling drugs at the dairy into D block. 
12. On February 21,1992, Waldron was found to have injection sites on 
his arm. Waldron admitted he had been injecting steroids at the dairy. 
2 
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13. Waldron was recruited by Leo Lucy, an investigator with the 
Department of Corrections to work as a confidential informant. 
14. On March 14, 1992, Waldron was moved from D-block on a 
temporary restriction order because he was "under investigation". 
15. On March 14, 1992, Waldron was released on a home visit where 
he agreed to purchase drugs to be smuggled into the prison as part of an undercover 
operation for the Investigations Bureau of the Department of Corrections. 
16. On March 14,1992, Tony Maestas was arrested for allegedly selling 
cocaine to Tony Waldron. 
17. On April 2,1992, a Special Attention Hearing was held by the Board 
of Pardons. A Special Attention Hearing is a review to grant relief to inmates under 
special circumstances where a change of status may be warranted. 
18. Waldron was paroled that day. He was serving time for ten counts 
of Forgery, second degree felonies, one count of Fraud, a third degree felony, and an 
additional count of Forgery, a third degree felony. 
19. Waldron was never formally disciplined for possession of a controlled 
substance or drug paraphernalia. 
20. Waldron was never charged with Possession of a Controlled 
Substance or Drug Paraphernalia. 
21. Waldron was never charged as a result of the Department of 
Corrections' investigation that began November 26, 1991, of his involvement in 
smuggling drugs into D-block. 
3 
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22. Leo Lucy, the investigator with the Department of Corrections who 
recruited Waldron, in a written statement, claimed that the only compensation Waldron 
received fo his role as a confidential informant was a letter of recommendation to the 
Board of Pardons that Waldron not lose his parole date as a result of a dirty urine test. 
23. A review of Waldron's prison files also revealed the following 
information relevant to his credibility: 
a. Waldron was convicted on September 14, 1992, of Forgery, 
a second degree felony, as well as Aggravated Assault by a Prisoner and Felony 
Fleeing. 
b. Waldron was convicted on December 12,1990, of two counts 
of Forgery, second degree felonies. 
c. On August 7,1986, Waldron was committed to the Utah State 
Prison on one count of Possession of a Forged Writing, a third degree felony, seven 
counts of Forgery, second degree felonies, and one count of Forgery, a third degree 
felony. 
d. Waldron had been assessed by the Department of Corrections 
in 1987 and had been described as an inmate who "cannot be trusted at all". 
e. In October of 1990, Waldron approached Lon Brian with the 
Davis County Metro Narcotics wanting to furnish information. Agent Brian requested use 
of Waldron for an undercover investigation. AP&P determined that "it would not be wise 
to allow him to participate" because of his history of drug dependency and attempted 
escape. Waldron was told "there would be no special consideration". 
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24. Also relevant to Waldron's credibility was the following information 
regarding his experience and skill at obtaining and hiding drugs on his person in the 
prison: 
a. The investigation into Waldron and other inmates that began 
in November of 1991 involved allegations that inmates were smuggling drugs by either 
hiding them in balloons in the mouth, or by "keistering" the drugs by hiding them in the 
anal cavity. 
b. On November 10,1989, Waldron was disciplined for a positive 
urinalysis for marijuana and for hiding a white object in his mouth which he swallowed 
before guards could retrieve it. 
c. On November 20, 1989, Waldron admitted hiding two 
marijuana joints in his mouth while being searched, slipping them from his mouth into 
a "pocket" he had cut inside his coat when the guard was not looking. 
d. On January 1,1988, Waldron was disciplined for Possession 
of a Controlled Substance found hidden in his sock. 
e. On May 29,1988, Waldron was disciplined for possession of 
a controlled substance. 
f. On June 7, 1988, Waldron was disciplined for a positive 
urinalysis for marijuana. 
g. On March 30,1987, Waldron was disciplined for possession 
of a controlled substance. 
5 
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25. A review of Waldron's prison file also revealed the following 
information suggesting that he had worked as confidential informant in the past: 
a. On July 15,1992, Waldron had safety concerns at the Weber 
County Jail because he had testified against other inmates. 
b. On November 5,1990, Waldron asked to be moved because 
of involvement in past drug dealing at the prison. 
c. Waldron's Offender Reassessment forms indicate he had 
safety concerns in February of 1990 and also in July of 1991. 
26. In respect to the chain of custody in Mr. Maestas' case, it was also 
discovered that money booked into evidence with the alleged cocaine was likely stolen 
by the custodian of the evidence. 
DATED this /$ day of-Oatobcr, 1997. 
BY THE COURT: ^ ^ l ' ; > / * \ 
JUDGE WILLIAM A. THORNE^ / 
Third District Court, Division I 
Approved as to form: 
'RICHARD'S. SHEPHERD 
Deputy District Attorney 
REBECCAS. HYDE 
Attorney for Defendant 
6 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the office of the District 
Attorney, 2001 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 this 'Z^cJav of 
October, 1997. 
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STATE OF UTAH 
ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE 
PROGRESS/VIOLATION REPORT 
TO: Third Judicial District Court REGARDING: MAESTES, Tony Robert 
Salt Lake County, Utah 
ATTN: Judge Michael R. Murphy CASE NO.: 921901600 
FROM: Field Operations/Region III OFFENSES: Unlawful Distribution of 
a Controlled Substance, a First 
Degree Felony; Possession of a 
Controlled Substance, a Third 
Degree Felony 
DATE: June 23,1994 OBSCIS: 00072192 
PROBATION DATE: December 20, 1993 ADDRESS: Odyssey House 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
DEFENSE ATTY: Victor Gordon EMPLOYMENT: None 
COMMENTS: 
Your Honor, on June 23, 1994 at 10:00 a.m., this agent was notified 
that the defendant, Tony Maestes, now residing at Odyssey House had 
become suicidal, homicidal, and had begun attacking staff and 
personnel at Odyssey House. The defendant was rushed to the 
University of Utah Medical Center for medical assistance. The 
University of Utah staff indicated nothing could be done for the 
defendant. Odyssey House personnel has requested the defendant be 
removed immediately from the program. Due to the defendant's criminal 
history this agency is requesting a No-Bail Bench Warrant be issued to 
hold the defendant pending an Order to Show Cause Hearing. 
conn 
IMMEDIATE ACTION TAKEN BY AGENT: NOTIFY SUPERVISOR AND COURT. 
RECOMMENDATION: A NO BAIL BENCH WARRANT BE ISSUED AND AN ORDER TO SHOW 
CAUSE HEARING "BE CONDUCTED. 
• -" --• t-(,U. • „ 
RICHARD W.' SULLIVAN, SUPERVISOR DOTOtf. WILSON PROBATION OFFICElT' 
APPROVED AND ORDERED : ^ ^M-
DENIED: 
DATE: V^S ' f V 
COMMENTS: ft kJ ~9?^ s&**jf 
MAESTES/DW/de 
0011 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BENCH WARRANT 
STATE OF UTAH : Case no: 921901600 FS 
VS. : Circuit no: C1853 921000471 
: Date of birth: 09/24/61 
DEFENDANT: : Dr license no: 0 UT 
MAESTAS, TONY R : Social sec no: - -
156 W MORRIS AVE : Vehicle lie no: 
SLC UT : Orig Agen #: 3922464 
: OTN # : 
TO ANY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER OF THE STATE OF UTAH: 
The above named defendant having been charged with the offense of 
DIST C/S W/IN 1000' OF PROHIBITED PLACE - 1ST DEGREE 
POSS OF A C/S - 3RD DEGREE 
committed on March 14, 1992 has failed to comply with probation. 
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED forthwith to arrest and bring 
the defendant before the Honorable Judge MICHAEL R MURPHY 
or to deliver the defendant to the custody of the sheriff of 
the above named county until further order of the court. 
NO BAIL 
ISSUED UNDER SEAL OF THIS COURT ON June 23, 1994. 
This warrant may be served any time, day or night. 
JUDGE MICHAEL R MURPHY 
COPY trUDGE / COURT CLERK 
com 
Addendum D 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
urArf s r u E OBSCIS AQ. 72192 
Consideration of the Status of MABSIAS, TONY ROMAX PRISON HO. 23259 
Iuj. above-enUtle 1 matter came 0:1 for consideration before th? Utaa Scace 3oard 
of Parjoua on the 16tii day of September, 1997, foi*: 
OHWIrfA', HfiAftliJS 
After a review of the submitted information and good cause appetrin^, ltd Board 
ia*:;es trie following decision ani order: 
*BSULrS 
Parole effective 09/01/1993. Final 
decision of the rearing h.»ld on 09/04/1997. 
i Pay $600,00 fine and aurciiirg* CASE* 92-io00. 
I ouccesjf'iily complete Substance A'jase 'Jieripy. 
J Successfully complete Cocunu/iity C3rrectloa-.l Center* (co 
addres.3 oubstiit-e -uijust* issued). 
Ho Crioc Sent Case No« 
T AKiA^EIoiSIUiullOH OF V L 921901600 







Tuis decision i3 subject tu review and modification by t is 3o*ird of Pardons at 
a ay tlua until actual relaa&e frona custody. 
By order of the Board of Pardons of tne State of Utan, I nave this date 
16th day of Septe^oer, 1*997, affiled ray signature as Ciairoan for and 
on behalf of the State of Utah, Board of Pardons* 
